











































I	 hereby	 declare	 that	 this	 dissertation,	 Pluralism	 and	 Diversity:	 For	 the	 Sake	 of	 Equal	






















































Introduction	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 		 	 		1	
1.	The	genealogy	of	pluralism’s	impact	on	the	formation	and	
development	of	liberal	political	theory	 	 	 	 		 													6						
1.1.	Religious	pluralism	and	its	consequences	for	political	
order:	Sovereignty	and	the	conception	of	toleration	 		 	 		7	
1.1.1.	Toleration	as	the	right	of	the	sovereign		 	 	 	 		7	
1.1.2.	Toleration	as	the	universal,	equal	right		
												to	free	conscience								 	 	 	 	 	 											17	
1.2.	Pluralism	in	modern	liberal	political	theory:		
	A	comprehensive,	perfectionist,	or	political	approach?		 											20	
1.2.1.	Comprehensive	perfectionist	liberalism	 	 	 											22	
1.2.2.	Comprehensive	non-perfectionist		
											liberalism	 		 		 	 	 	 	 	 											26	
1.2.2.	Non-comprehensive	non-perfectionist	
		 	liberalism	 		 				 	 	 	 	 	 											29	
2.	Respect	as	a	default	moral	principle	under	the	conditions	
of	pluralism	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											38	
2.1.	The	essentially	political	level:	The	justification	of	coercion	for	
the	sake	of	respect	for	liberty	 	 	 	 	 											39	
2.2.	The	societal	level:	Struggles	for	recognition	as	struggles	
for	respect	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											44	
2.3.	Recognition	respect:	The	third-person	or	
second-person	form?		 	 	 	 	 	 	 											51	
3.	The	justification	of	the	exercise	of	political	power	and	
the	formation	of	public	reason		 	 	 	 	 	 											54	
3.1.	Standards	of	the	justification	of	political	power	and	
its	legitimacy	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											54	
3.2.	The	principle	of	respect	and	the	requirement	of	
both	the	moral	and	epistemological	reasonableness		
of	persons	 													 	 	 	 	 	 	 											63	
 	
4.	Criticism	of	the	imperative	of	respect	and	the	dual	
interpretation	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	 	 	 	 											70	
4.1.	The	criterion	of	reciprocity:	The	imperative	of	respect	
and	the	role	of	people’s	particularities	 	 	 	 											71	
4.1.1.	The	convergence	approach	as	a	solution?		 	 											74	
4.2.	The	role	of	the	political	community	and	the	dual	
interpretation	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity		 	 		 											79	
4.3.	Civic	friendship	and	a	way	to	achieve	respect	at	both	




5.1.1.	The	case	of	the	Kouachi	brothers	 	 	 	 											97	
5.2.	Disrespect	and	misrecognition	as	reasons	for	outrage		 											99		
Conclusion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 								105	
















Pluralism	and	diversity	define	our	present	world.	They	 are	 all	 about	us,	 as	 Jacqueline	
Woodson	writes,	and	it	is	thus	only	up	to	us	to	figure	out	how	to	walk	through	this	world	
together.1	In	fact,	living	peacefully	side	by	side	despite	our	differences	is	one	of	the	biggest	







assert	 that	 liberal	 political	 theory	 is	 almost	 unimaginable	 without	 allowing	 for	 the	
impacts	 of	 pluralism	 and	diversity,	 as	 they	 have	 determined	 the	 crucial	 concepts	 that	
define	 it:	 tolerance,	neutrality,	 autonomy,	 respect,	 and	 legitimacy,	 among	other	 things.	
Pluralism	 and	 diversity	 have	 also	 influenced	 internal	 differentiations	 within	 liberal	






he	asked	how	it	 is	possible	to	organize	a	stable	and	 just	society	comprised	of	 free	and	
equal	 citizens	 who	 are,	 nevertheless,	 divided	 by	 their	 conflicting	 –	 and	 often	
incommensurable	 –	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good	 life.2	 In	 his	 book,	 Rawls	 introduced	 the	











best	way	of	 dealing	with	 the	 fact	 of	 pluralism.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 I	 am	not	 a	
boundless	admirer	of	it,	as	I	also	see	some	of	its	weaknesses.	To	be	more	specific,	when	
responding	 to	 the	 communitarian	 critique,	 Rawls	 emphasized	 that	 political	 liberalism	





between	 them.	However,	 the	 problem	 is	 that	Rawls	 –	 and	 other	 political	 liberals	who	




Kymlicka	 acknowledges,	 the	 public	 sphere	 of	 a	 liberal	 political	 community	 is	 not	 as	





















prove	 such	 a	 claim,	 I	 argue	 that	 both	 spheres	 defining	 the	 character	 of	 a	 political	
community	are	based	on	the	same	default	principle	–	that	of	respect.	Respect	is	thus	the	
purpose	of	both	justifying	the	exercise	of	political	power	at	the	essentially	political	level	
and	achieving	 justice	at	the	societal	 level.	This	 is	precisely	where	the	core	of	the	 inner	
discrepancy	 within	 political	 liberalism	 lies:	 although	 political	 liberalism	 refers	 to	 the	
principle	of	respect	when	addressing	the	justification	of	the	exercise	of	political	power,	it	
overlooks	 manifestations	 of	 disrespect	 at	 the	 other	 –	 societal	 –	 level	 of	 a	 political	
community.	Are	these	different	approaches	to	respect	consistent?	Is	it	correct	to	promote	
equal	 citizenship	 only	 based	 on	 essentially	 political	 questions	 but	 to	 overlook	 other	
factors	influencing	the	character	of	citizenship?	I	do	not	think	it	is	correct:	if	respect	is	not	
ensured	also	at	the	societal	level,	the	very	essentially	political	level	is	in	fact	undermined.	
Respect	 is	 a	 universal	 moral	 principle	 that	 can	 hardly	 be	 understood	 only	 partially.	
Accordingly,	 if	 the	 manifestations	 of	 disrespect	 within	 a	 liberal	 political	 community	
remain	 even	 after	 the	 process	 of	 justification	 of	 political	 power,	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	












the	 criterion	 of	 reciprocity	 interpreted	 by	 means	 of	 civic	 friendship	 is	 that	 it	
retrospectively	influences	the	very	character	of	respect.			
 4	
This	 is	because	civic	 friendship	 inherently	shifts	 the	understanding	of	 the	character	of	
respect	from	a	third-person	imperative	to	a	second-person	act	of	recognition.	In	this	way	
the	 interpretation	 from	 the	 civic	 friendship	perspective	does	 two	 things.	 First,	 it	 is	 an	
argument	 that	 proceeds	 directly	 from	 the	 conceptual	 apparatus	 of	 political	 liberalism	










the	 inner	differentiations	within	contemporary	 liberal	political	 theory.	 I	 round	off	 this	


















reciprocity	 interpreted	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 imperative	 of	 respect.	 First,	 it	 is	 a	
critique	of	the	claim	that,	for	the	sake	of	respect,	people	refrain	from	their	particularities	
when	publicly	 deliberating.	 Second,	 it	 is	 the	 objection	 that	 the	 criterion	 of	 reciprocity	








point	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 young	Muslims	 of	 immigrant	 origin	 in	 France	 and	 show	 the	
destructive	consequences	of	misrecognition	at	the	societal	level	for	a	political	community	
as	 a	whole.	 I	 argue	 that	 only	 a	 dual	 interpretation	 of	 the	 criterion	 of	 reciprocity	may	















of	 liberal	 political	 theory.	 Accordingly,	 I	 will	 conclude	 this	 historical	 excursion	 by	
introducing	the	approach	that	will	be	the	object	of	my	interest	in	the	forthcoming	chapters	
–	 political	 (non-comprehensive	 non-perfectionist)	 liberalism.	 In	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	
chapter	I	will	focus	primarily	on	religious	pluralism	and	argue	that	it	gave	rise	to	liberal	
political	 theory.	 Specifically,	 I	 will	 show	 how	 religious	 pluralism	 influenced	 the	
understanding	of	sovereignty	and	how	it	was	the	germ	of	the	conception	of	tolerance.	I	
will	 then	 assert	 that	 although	 tolerance	was	 originally	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 right	 of	 the	
sovereign,	 later	 on	 it	 evolved	 into	 freedom	 of	 conscience	 as	 a	 universal	 human	 right	






affected	 its	 very	 understanding	 within	 liberal	 political	 theory.	 Using	 the	 framework	
proposed	by	Jonathan	Quong,	 in	the	second	part	of	this	chapter,	 I	will	 thus	distinguish	
between	three	contemporary	versions	of	liberalism	that	deal	with	the	fact	of	pluralism	
differently:	 I	will	 elaborate	 on	 comprehensive	perfectionist	 liberalism;	 comprehensive	




1.1.	 Religious	 pluralism	 and	 its	 consequences	 for	 political	 order:	
Sovereignty	and	the	conception	of	toleration	
1.1.1.	Toleration	as	the	right	of	the	sovereign	
Until	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 there	 was	 relative	 homogeneity	 in	 Western	 Europe	 with	
regard	 to	 religious	belief.	Despite	 the	 external	 influence	of	 Islam,	Catholicism	was	 the	
central	religion,	and	the	Catholic	Church	played	a	dominant	role.	The	situation	changed	
when	Martin	Luther,	a	German	theologian,	released	his	ninety-five	theses	(Disputatio	pro	
declaration	virtutis	 indulgentiarium).6	 In	his	disputation,	not	only	did	he	 repudiate	 the	




are	 determined	by	 our	 sinful	 natures,	 there	 is	 nothing	 that	 could	 justify	 us	 –	 and	 our	
actions	–	before	God.8	These	 thoughts	 instigated	 the	Reformation.	So-called	Protestant	
reformers	followed	Luther	and	came	to	believe	that	the	Catholic	Church	was	no	longer	
the	 church	 established	 by	 Jesus.	 Consequently,	 they	 rejected	 its	 authority.	 Apart	 from	







sphere.	 This	 not	 only	 led	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 modern	 theories	 and	 practices	 of	




















always	 seized	 of	 his	 power.”12	 Reflecting	 on	 the	 origins	 of	 political	 authority,	 Bodin	
proposed	a	voluntarist	conception	derived	from	the	assumption	that	all	power	is	of	God.13	
It	implied	that	the	sovereign	had	the	right	to	push	through	his	commands:	law	was	simply	
a	 command	 issued	 by	 the	 sovereign	 that	 was	 independent	 of	 the	 consent	 of	 those	
commanded.	 Political	 society	was	 to	 be	modeled	 on	 the	 natural	 society	 of	 the	 family.	
Bodin	claimed	that	every	family	had	its	own	sovereign	–	the	father	–	who	decided	about	
the	life	and	death	of	his	wife	and	children.	This	meant	that	other	family	members	–	the	
wife	 and	 children	 –	were	mere	 subjects,	 as	 their	 liberty	was	 limited	 by	 the	 sovereign	
power	of	father.	The	same	order	applied	to	the	state.	According	to	Bodin,	every	citizen	
was	 a	 subject,	 and	 his	 liberty	was	 limited	 by	 the	 sovereign	 power	 to	whom	 he	 owed	
obedience.	 Still,	 Bodin	 did	 not	 assume	 a	 one-sided	 obligation	 of	 the	 subject	 to	 the	
sovereign.	 Bodin	 asserted	 that	 in	 return	 for	 the	 faith	 and	 obedience	 rendered	 to	 the	
sovereign,	the	sovereign	had	to	protect	his	subjects	and	provide	them	with	justice.14	
Nevertheless,	 Bodin	 not	 only	 proposed	 a	 conception	 of	 the	 sovereign	 as	 a	 supreme	
authority,	but	he	also	made	a	case	for	toleration.	In	Six	Books,	Bodin	took	two	seemingly	
contradictory	 steps:	 he	 argued	 that	 religion	 was	 an	 important	 foundation	 of	 the	
commonwealth,	 as	 it	 induced	 obedience,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 he	 rejected	 religious	








considered	 it	 to	be	 the	 imperative	of	 the	prince,	 and	 it	was	up	 to	him	 to	establish	 the	
conditions	under	which	religion	would	be	tolerated.	As	Forst	later	argues16	in	Colloquium,	
however,	 Bodin	 also	 developed	 an	 interpersonal	 perspective	 of	 tolerance	 when	 he	

































The	 argument	 that	 public	 worship	 is	 an	 attribute	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 the	 (limited)	











the	Old	 Testament,	 as	 people	were	 able	 to	 gain	 knowledge	 of	 this	 law	 through	 “right	
reason.”28	No	matter	what	religion,	the	law	of	nature	was	common	to	all	human	beings.	



































to	 this	 Assembly	 of	 men,	 on	 this	 condition,	 that	 thou	 give	 up	 thy	 Right	 to	 him,	 and	





of	 conscience	 and	 its	 development.	 In	 the	 state	 of	 nature,	 Hobbes	 considered	 an	
individual’s	conscience	to	be	shared	knowledge	based	on	connivance.36	Specifically,	he	
argued	that	when	two	or	more	people	were	aware	of	the	same	fact,	they	were	mutually	


















individuals	 departed	 from	 the	 state	 of	 nature,	 entered	 into	 a	 social	 contract,	 and	
established	 a	 political	 society.	 Thereafter,	 the	 various	 consciences	 of	 individuals	were	
united	 into	 a	 single	 –	 public	 –	 conscience.	 Hobbes	 argued	 that	 this	 unification	 of	
consciences	gave	rise	to	the	establishment	of	public	reason,	which	he	considered	to	be	the	
reason	 of	 “God’s	 Supreme	 Lieutenant”	 and	which	 became	 the	 only	 judge	 after	 people	
entrusted	him	with	sovereign	power.40	According	 to	Hobbes,	 the	sovereign’s	 judgment	
was	 the	 “last	 opinion	 in	 search	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 past	 and	 future,”	 and	 the	 people	were	
obligated	to	follow	it	and	not	to	dissent.41	This	implies	that	while	Hobbes	claimed	that	a	
private	 conscience	might	 be	 erroneous,	 the	 judgment	 of	 the	 sovereign	was	 the	 public	
determination	 of	 the	 truth.42	 Still,	 although	 by	 establishing	 the	 sovereign	 the	 private	
conscience	had	to	submit	to	the	public	conscience,	Hobbes	assumed	that	when	a	person	
























political	 religion	 in	 the	 form	of	a	 ‘civil	 religion’	was	necessary	 to	maintain	sovereignty.”	Forst,	
Toleration	in	Conflict:	Past	and	Present,	p.	196.	
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to	 eschew	 religious	 conflicts	 –	 when	 the	 political	 authority	 of	 the	 sovereign	 was	
guaranteed,	 limited	 toleration	of	 private	beliefs	was	 to	be	 enabled.47	 Even	 John	Locke	









religious	 matters	 and	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 sovereign	 was	 the	 personification	 of	 God.	
Considering	this,	it	is	important	to	grasp	Locke’s	conception	of	faith.	Locke	argued	that	
true	religion	consisted	in	the	inner	conviction	of	the	mind,	which	implied	that	everyone	
was	 the	 sovereign	 in	 judging	 for	 himself.	 Yet,	 it	 did	 not	 deny	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
relationship	between	man	and	God.	On	the	contrary	–	Locke	claimed	that	the	happiness	
of	everyone	depended	on	believing	in	God	and	behaving	in	a	way	that	was	necessary	for	














voluntarist	 conception	 of	 God.51	 He	 supposed	 that	 man	 –	 as	 the	 creation	 of	 one	
omnipotent	God	–	was	sent	into	the	world	by	God’s	order	and	was	thus	his	property.52	
Therefore,	according	 to	Locke,	man	and	his	 life	depended	on	being	 in	conformity	with	
God’s	 commands.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 –	 following	 the	 property	 logic	 resulting	 from	 the	
Almighty	 and	 his	will	 –	 Locke	 supposed	 that	 “every	man	 has	 his	 property	 in	 his	 own	
person.”53	Not	only	did	it	mean	that	no	one	else	but	God	had	any	right	to	man,	but	it	also	
signified	that	everyone	was	responsible	for	himself,	his	conscience,	and	deeds.	Only	a	fully	




the	essence	of	 temporal	power	 lied	primarily	 in	ensuring	all	 rights	 following	 from	the	
social	contract	to	citizens.	Specifically,	Locke	claimed	that	the	aim	of	the	commonwealth	
was	to	procure,	preserve,	and	advance	the	civil	interests	of	people	(including	life,	liberty,	
health,	 and	 property).55	 He	 emphasized	 that	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 magistrate	 only	
covered	these	civil	concerns	and	could	in	no	way	be	extended	to	salvation	or	religious	
























in	 his	 civil	 enjoyments	 owing	 to	 his	 different	 beliefs.	 Secondly,	 Locke	 applied	 the	
argument	of	mutual	toleration	to	individual	churches.	Locke	claimed	that	no	church	had	
jurisdiction	over	any	other	church,	not	even	if	the	civil	magistrate	was	a	member	of	one	










































that	 place	 than	 elsewhere.”65	 Yet,	 Locke’s	 willingness	 to	 tolerate	 religion	 was	 not	
unlimited,	as	he	claimed	that	tolerance	should	not	be	advanced	in	cases	where	it	would	
have	 dangerous	 political	 consequences.	 In	 particular,	 he	 claimed	 that	 Catholics	 and	
atheists	should	not	be	granted	tolerance.66	Catholics	were	not	trustworthy,	for	they	owed	
their	 allegiance	 to	 the	 pope.67	 Atheists	 were	 not	 to	 be	 trusted	 because	 promises,	
covenants,	and	oaths	–	the	cement	of	society	–	could	have	no	hold	upon	them.68	In	other	









he	 advocated	 a	 prudential	 approach	 and	 practical	 judgment	 that	 led	 him	 to	 traditional	 texts.	




which	 is	 constituted	 upon	 such	 a	 bottom	 that	 all	 those	 who	 enter	 into	 it	 do	 thereby	 deliver	






How	 tolerance	was	 conceived	 –	particularly	 the	 objects	 of	 tolerance	 –	 changed	 in	 the	
eighteenth	century	due	to	the	revolutionary	events	in	America	and	France.	For	example,	






that	 the	 natural	 rights	 that	 should	 be	 transferred	 were	 those	 in	 which	 the	 power	 to	
execute	them	was	defective.	On	the	contrary,	the	natural	rights	which	man	retained	were	
those	 in	which	 the	power	 to	execute	 them	was	a	perfect	 in	 the	 individual	 at	 the	 right	





























man	 and	God.	 In	An	Act	 for	 Establishing	Religious	 Freedom,	he	 asserted	 that	 since	 the	
Almighty	had	created	the	free	mind,	all	attempts	to	influence	it	by	temporal	power	are	a	
departure	from	the	plan	and	the	intentions	of	God.75	Hence,	according	to	Jefferson,	the	
power	 of	 government	 could	 only	 extend	 to	 such	 acts	 that	 were	 harmful	 to	 others.76	





way	diminish,	 enlarge,	 or	 affect	 their	 civil	 capacities.	 77	Accordingly,	 even	 though	both	
Paine	 and	 Jefferson	 based	 their	 advocacy	 of	 freedom	 of	 conscience	 on	 the	 religious	






Another	 event	 that	 significantly	 contributed	 to	 the	 turn	 toward	human	 rights	was	 the	
French	Revolution.	The	Déclaration	des	droits	de	l’homme	et	du	citoyen	clearly	declared	
human	rights	to	be	natural,	 imprescriptible,	and	inalienable.	It	also	supposed	that	men	














advocated	 the	 ideas	of	natural	 freedom	and	the	equality	of	all	men.	 It	also	guaranteed	
freedom	 of	 speech	 (including	 the	 liberty	 to	 speak,	 write,	 print,	 and	 publish)	 and	
prohibited	 censorship.81	 In	 the	 context	 of	 human	 rights,	 the	 declaration	 and	 the	
constitution	followed	in	the	footsteps	of	Lockean	ideas	originally	put	into	practice	during	
the	 American	 Revolution.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 declaration	 and	 the	 constitution	 also	
elaborated	 the	 ideas	 introduced	 by	 Jean-Jacques	 Rousseau.	 It	 concerned	 mainly	 the	
concept	 of	 sovereignty.	 The	 constitution	 claimed	 not	 only	 that	 natural	 rights	 were	
inalienable	and	imprescriptible	but	also	that	sovereignty	was	indivisible,	inalienable,	and	
imprescriptible.	Consequently,	in	both	the	declaration	and	constitution,	it	was	argued	that	



























not,	 as	 toleration	was	 transformed	 into	 the	universal	 equal	 right	of	 all	 citizens	 to	 free	
conscience,	and	the	state’s	duty	was	consequently	to	tolerate	this	right.85	
1.2.	 Pluralism	 in	 modern	 liberal	 political	 theory:	 A	 comprehensive,	
perfectionist,	or	political	approach?	
To	summarize	what	has	been	written	so	far,	in	the	previous	part,	I	showed	how	the	fact	
of	 pluralism	 –	 religious	 pluralism	 in	 particular	 –	 influenced	 the	 establishment	 and	
development	 of	 liberal	 political	 theory.	 Not	 only	 did	 it	 affect	 the	 understanding	 of	
sovereignty,	but	 it	also	 framed	 the	conception	of	 tolerance	 that	 later	 transformed	 into	
freedom	of	conscience.	This	move	toward	a	universal	human	right	to	free	conscience	was	
crucial	 for	 the	 further	 development	 of	 pluralism	 and	 how	 it	 is	 now	 comprehended	 in	





actors	or	 the	Church).	According	 to	him,	a	person	should	only	be	obedient	 to	her	self-
imposed	laws.	Consequently,	it	is	the	idea	of	autonomy	that	assures	that	a	person’s	own	
 
85	 Nonetheless,	 the	 equal	 right	 to	 free	 conscience	 not	 only	 generated	 the	 duty	 of	 the	 state	 to	
tolerate	 people’s	 consciences,	 but	 it	 simultaneously	 implied	 the	 duty	 of	 not	 favoring	 (or	
disfavoring)	any	personal	 convictions	 (particularly	 religious	ones)	 in	 the	public	 sphere,	which	





the	 distinction	 of	 the	 power	 of	 the	 church	 and	 the	 state.	 It	 caused	 religion	 to	 be	 definitively	
excluded	from	politics	and	the	public	sphere	to	be	based	solely	on	the	values	of	citizenship	shared	
by	 everyone,	 regardless	 of	 personal	 belief.	 Hereby,	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 liberal	 state	 was	
completed.	Galeotti,	“Toleration,”	pp.	58–62;	Galeotti,	Toleration	as	Recognition,	pp.	25–26.	
86	Rousseau	understood	autonomy	in	the	context	of	the	political	sphere.	He	described	it	as	self-







one’s	 life	 plan	 and	 to	 act	 in	 accordance	 with	 one’s	 own	 values.88	 Although	 there	 are	






In	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 take	 a	 deeper	 look	 at	 pluralism	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 diversity	 in	
conceptions	of	the	good.	Specifically,	I	will	retrospectively	analyze	modern	liberal	political	
theory90	 and	 outline	 approaches	 that	 differ	 in	 how	 they	 interpret	 the	 character	 of	
pluralism	and	its	consequences	for	 liberal	political	 theory.	 In	this	context,	 I	consider	 it	






















liberalism.	 Finally,	 if	 the	 answer	 to	 both	 questions	 is	 “no,”	 we	 then	 advocate	 non-
comprehensive	non-perfectionist	liberalism.93	
1.2.1.	Comprehensive	perfectionist	liberalism	




should	 be	 promoted	 by	 the	 state	 then	 consists	 of	 the	 very	 value	 of	 pluralism,	 which	
enables	people	to	choose	their	conceptions	of	the	good	and	accomplish	an	autonomous	






93	 Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 mention	 comprehensive/non-comprehensive	 (political)	 and	
perfectionist/non-perfectionist	liberalism	separately.	Considering	this,	other	forms	of	liberalism	
could	 exist,	 i.e.,	 solely	 non-comprehensive	 liberalism,	 the	mentioned	modus	 vivendi	 version	 of	
non-comprehensive	liberalism	(with	David	Gauthier	as	a	proponent	of	such	an	approach),	or	the	
public	justification	version	of	non-comprehensive	liberalism	(apart	from	Rawls,	Gerald	Gaus	and	















95	 Still,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 only	 interpretation	 of	 comprehensive	 perfectionist	 liberalism.	 Gaus	
distinguishes	 four	 versions	 of	 comprehensive	 liberalism:	 liberalism	 as	 a	 secular	 philosophy,	
liberalism	as	a	philosophy	of	the	good	life,	liberalism	as	a	political	theory	derived	from	a	specific	














to	 be	 and	 do.	 In	 other	words,	 diversity	 of	 choice	 enables	 people	 to	 be	 autonomous.99	
Therefore,	although	Berlin	refused	one	monistic	ideal,	his	assumption	of	pluralism	as	an	
inevitable	fact	predetermining	people’s	lives	was	itself	a	particular	conception	of	the	good	
life	 that	 Berlin	 considered	 to	 be	 correct.100	 Berlin	 presented	 a	 comprehensive	 moral	
doctrine	based	on	a	controversial	conception	of	the	good	that	determined	what	life	would	
be	 considered	 to	be	valuable.	Accordingly,	Berlin	 argued	 that	 such	a	 life	was	 the	 “one	
according	to	which	objective	value	is	ultimately	not	of	a	single	kind	but	of	many	kinds.”101	
Still,	 even	 though	 I	 accept	Nussbaum’s	 claim	 about	 the	 comprehensiveness	 of	Berlin’s	





















problem	 lies	 in	Nussbaum’s	 very	 definition	 of	 perfectionism:	 she	defines	 perfectionist	
liberalism	 as	 a	 type	 of	 comprehensive	 liberalism	 that	 bases	 political	 principles	 on	 a	
comprehensive	 doctrine	 about	 human	 life	 covering	 both	 the	 political	 domain	 and	 the	
domain	 of	 general	 human	 conduct.102	 Thus,	 Nussbaum	 identifies	 perfectionism	 with	
comprehensiveness.	Not	only	does	she	not	 take	 into	consideration	Quong’s	 remark	on	
perfectionism	as	a	doctrine	promoting	or	discouraging	certain	ways	of	 life	on	grounds	
relating	to	their	 inherent	value,	but	she	also	does	not	allow	for	 the	 fact	 that	a	positive	
answer	to	the	 first	question	does	not	 inevitably	 imply	a	positive	answer	to	the	second	
question.	 Hence,	 because	 Berlin	 never	 claimed	 that	 pluralism	 should	 be	 promoted	
politically,	it	is	dubious	to	describe	him	as	a	perfectionist	liberal.	









distinct	 virtues,	 each	 capable	 of	 being	 pursued	 for	 its	 own	 sake.105	 Like	 Berlin,	 Raz	
supposes	that	the	possibility	of	a	conflict	of	values	can	never	be	excluded	from	human	life.	
In	fact,	Raz	contends	that	pluralism	of	values	should	be	understood	as	true	in	the	sense		
that	 people’s	 believing	 in	 the	 truth	 of	 pluralism	 enables	 them	 to	 extend	 autonomy	 to	
others,	although	they	pursue	ends	that	other	people	do	not	value.106	Apart	from	such	a	
comprehensive	argument	implying	that	pluralism	is	a	moral	ideal	covering	all	spheres	of	














meets	 the	 conditions	 for	 being	 classified	 as	 a	 proponent	 of	 the	 comprehensive	
perfectionist	approach	to	liberalism.	Like	Raz,	Wall	considers	pluralism	to	be	the	basis	of	






conceptions	 of	 good.110	 In	 other	 words,	 this	 recognition	 compels	 people	 to	 act	
autonomously.111	 Owing	 just	 to	 its	meaning	 for	 autonomy,	Wall	 claims	 that	 pluralism	
should	 be	 deemed	 as	 independently	 valuable.	 Hereby,	 Wall	 substantiates	 the	
comprehensive	role	of	pluralism	within	liberal	political	theory.	Due	to	the	intrinsic	value	
of	 pluralism,	 Wall	 also	 rejects	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 state	 should	 not	 use	 an	 objective	
conception	 of	 the	 good	 to	 justify	 state	 action.112	 On	 the	 contrary,	 he	 develops	 a	























political	 theory	 to	 prohibit	 the	 state	 from	 promoting	 the	 good	 –	 even	 if	 there	 is	 a	
disagreement	about	the	character	of	the	good.114	At	the	same	time,	however,	he	argues	





the	extent	 that	 it	 aims	 to	promote	 the	good	 in	 this	political	 society,	 should	be	neutral	
between	these	ideals	in	its	support	of	them.”115	




























asserts	 the	 principle	 of	 neutrality	 and	 introduces	 the	 concept	 of	 neutral	 conversation	
between	 people	 holding	 different	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good.118	 Ackerman	 argues	 that	
although	 a	 liberal	 community	 is	 based	 on	 the	 desire	 of	 people	 to	 communicate	 with	
others,	at	the	same	time,	these	people	are	also	striving	to	promote	diverse	conceptions	of	





comprehensive.	 Consequently,	 such	 a	 conception	 of	 neutrality	 only	 convinces	 those	
holding	certain	attitudes	toward	human	life:	those	who	assert	a	skeptical	point	of	view	
given	the	conception	of	the	good,	those	who	advocate	the	value	of	experimentation,	and	





person	 must	 acknowledge	 “several	 good	 reasons	 for	 imposing	 liberal	 constraints	 on	















conceptions	 of	 the	 good,	 it	 is	 a	 comprehensive	 conception	 adverting	 to	 certain	moral	
ideals	that	are	unacceptable	to	some	people.	
Ronald	Dworkin	also	proposes	neutrality	as	a	way	to	deal	with	pluralism,	but	his	attitude	
differs	 from	 Ackerman’s.	 While	 Ackerman	 argues	 that	 the	 constitutive	 value	 of	 his	
understanding	of	liberalism	lies	in	neutral	dialogue,	Dworkin	asserts	that	his	version	of	
neutrality	 –	 the	 so-called	 neutrality	 thesis	 –	 is	 derived	 from	 equality	 as	 the	 founding	
principle	of	his	version	of	liberalism.121	Yet,	although	Dworkin	insists	on	the	priority	of	
equality	 and	 argues	 that	 it	 has	 priority	 over	 liberty,	 equality	 and	 liberty	 seem	 to	 be	
interdependent.	In	A	Matter	of	Principles,	Dworkin	explicitly	argues	that	it	means	the	same	
for	 the	government	 to	 treat	 its	citizens	as	equals	as	 it	does	 to	 treat	 them	as	 free.122	 In	
Sovereign	Virtue,	he	repeats	that	equality	cannot	be	defined	without	assuming	liberty.123	
Therefore,	even	though	Dworkin	deems	equality	to	be	the	founding	principle,	at	the	same	
time,	 he	 describes	 equal	 people	 (those	 who	 should	 receive	 equal	 respect)	 as	 those	




















126	 Dworkin,	 “Liberalism,”	 p.	 127.	 See	 also	 Finegan,	 “Dworkin	 on	 Equality,	 Autonomy	 and	
Authenticity,”	p.	145.	
 29	
diverse	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good	 and	 does	 not	want	 the	 state	 to	 promote	 any	 specific	
doctrine	of	the	good	life,	his	understanding	of	neutrality	is	comprehensive,	for	it	is	based	
on	 the	 specific	 conception	 of	 a	 valuable	 human	 life	 depending	 on	 the	 principle	 of	
autonomy	that	may	not	be	acceptable	to	everyone.127	
Comprehensive	 non-perfectionist	 liberalism,	 which	 I	 have	 described	 by	means	 of	 the	












political	 resolution	 to	 the	 fact	 of	 pluralism.	 The	 central	 proponent	 of	 this	 approach	 is	
undoubtedly	 John	Rawls.	Rawls	establishes	pluralism	as	 the	main	 issue	 in	his	Political	
Liberalism:	he	considers	it	to	be	an	inevitable	fact	that	citizens	living	in	a	free	democratic	
society	 inevitably	 differ	 with	 regard	 to	 their	 worldviews.	 Consequently,	 Rawls	 asks	
whether	and	how	it	 is	possible	to	have	a	stable	and	 just	society	comprised	of	 free	and	
equal	citizens	divided	by	conflicting	–	and	sometimes	incommensurable	–	conceptions	of	
the	good	life.128	 In	other	words,	he	examines	how	it	 is	possible	to	establish	a	common,	
unified	 law	 in	 a	 diverse	 society.	 Rawls	 mentions	 two	 main	 challenges	 that	 a	 society	
characterized	 by	 pluralism	of	 values	must	 overcome.	 The	 first	 challenge	 concerns	 the	
legitimate	 use	 of	 coercive	 political	 power.	 Rawls	 introduces	 a	 liberal	 principle	 of	
legitimacy	 based	 on	 the	 criterion	 of	 reciprocity,	 claiming	 that	 the	 exercise	 of	 political	
 




power	 “is	 fully	proper	only	when	 it	 is	 exercised	 in	accordance	with	a	 constitution	 the	
essentials	of	which	all	citizens	as	free	and equal	may	reasonably	be	expected	to	endorse	
in	the	light	of	principles	and	ideals	acceptable	to	their	common	human	reason.”129	Citizens	

















Yet,	 even	 though	 the	 assumption	 of	 reasonableness	 sets	 down	 certain	 conditions	 that	
make	the	legitimization	of	coercive	power	in	a	society	defined	by	pluralism	easier,	it	does	













the	 idea	 of	 a	 well-ordered	 society	 regulated	 by	 a	 political	 conception	 of	 justice.133	
Nonetheless,	what	is	important	is	that	the	political	conception	of	justice	is	not	inferred	
from	a	particular	comprehensive	doctrine,	nor	is	 it	a	modus	vivendi	among	a	variety	of	
comprehensive	 doctrines.	 It	 is	 freestanding,	 which	 means	 that	 “it	 is	 left	 to	 citizens	
individually	–	as	part	of	liberty	of	conscience	–	to	settle	how	they	think	the	values	of	the	
political	domain	are	related	to	other	values	in	their	comprehensive	doctrine.”134	Rawls	
asserts	 that	political	power	 is	 legitimate	only	due	to	 individuals’	appraisals	of	political 
values.	
This	 brings	 me	 to	 the	 second	 challenge	 of	 a	 society	 characterized	 by	 pluralism	 –	the	
question	of	stability,	which	Rawls	responds	to	with	the	notion	of	overlapping	consensus.	
He	argues	that	“an	overlapping	consensus	is	not	merely	a	consensus	on	accepting	certain	
authorities	 […]	 founded	on	a	 convergence	of	 self	 or	 group	 interests.”135	All	 those	who	
affirm	the	constitutional	essentials	and	principles	of	justice	should	start	within	their	own	
comprehensive	 doctrines.	 In	 other	 words,	 to	 achieve	 overlapping	 consensus,	 citizens	
affirming	a	political	conception	do	not	abandon	their	moral,	religious,	and	philosophical	
views,	since	these	views	ground	the	very	nature	of	 the	affirmation.	Although	everyone	
endorses	 the	 political	 conception	 of	 justice	 for	 different	 reasons	 and	 from	 her	 own	
perspective,	this	fact	enables	an	overlapping	consensus	that	is	stable	for	the	right	reasons.	





includes	 certain	 political	 virtues	 (fair	 social	 cooperation,	 reasonableness).	 Still,	 Rawls	
denies	 that	 it	 implies	 that	 his	 conception	 of	 neutrality	 is	 based	 on	 a	 particular	
comprehensive	 doctrine	 adhering	 to	moral	 ideals	 that	may	 be	 unacceptable	 for	 some	
people.136	In	other	words,	although	Rawls’s	justice	as	fairness	refers	to	substantive	values,	
it	 is	 not	 based	 on	 one	 comprehensive	 doctrine	 defining	 a	 valuable	 human	 life	 (i.e.,	









is	 based	 on	 a	 particular	 comprehensive	 doctrine	 –	 he	 argues	 that	 justice	 as	 fairness	
satisfies	such	neutrality.137	





citizens	 adopt	 a	 political	 conception	 and	 justify	 it	 by	 embedding	 it	 into	 their	
comprehensive	 doctrines.	 Third	 is	 public	 justification	 of	 the	 political	 conception	 by	
political	 society.	Rawls	asserts	 that	not	until	now	do	all	 the	 ideas	mentioned	earlier	 –	
reasonable	overlapping	consensus,	stability	for	the	right	reasons,	and	legitimacy	–	come	





presents	 the	 so-called	moral	duty	of	 civility	 as	 “a	willingness	 to	 listen	 to	others	and	a	
fairmindedness	in	deciding	when	accommodations	to	their	views	should	reasonably	be	




Charles	 Larmore	 is	 another	 author	 who	 elaborates	 a	 non-comprehensive	 non-














about	which	people	will	 disagree.143	 In	 order	 not	 to	misunderstand	 the	 simple	 fact	 of	
pluralism	and	pluralism	as	a	 comprehensive	doctrine,	Larmore	claims	 that	 the	central	
issue	that	should	interest	political	liberals	is	reasonable	disagreement.	As	he	argues,	it	has	
become	a	salient	feature	of	modern	experience	that	discussion	among	reasonable	people	
tends	 not	 toward	 consensus	 but	 toward	 disagreement.144	 Still,	 Larmore	 asks	 why	
reasonable	people	tend	to	naturally	disagree	about	the	meaning	of	life.	Although	he	sees	
Rawls’s	burdens	of	judgment	as	a	promising	explanation,	at	the	same	time,	he	argues	that	
it	 falls	 short	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 explanation	he	 seeks,	 for	 the	 burdens	 of	 judgment	 are	 not	
peculiar	 to	 reasoning	 about	 values.145	 Therefore,	 Larmore	 states	 that	 reasonable	
disagreement	is	a	fact	that	we	should	expect	when	dealing	with	complex	questions,	and	
he	 adds	 a	 bit	 laconically	 that	 we	 do	 not	 need	 any	 explanation	 to	 recognize	 this	
phenomenon.146	He	thus	understands	reasonable	disagreement	as	something	that	cannot	
be	eliminated.	Accordingly,	Larmore	argues	that	liberalism’s	primary	ambition	should	be	
to	 search	 for	principles	 that	would	express	 fundamental	moral	 values	 that	 reasonable	
people	 could	 accept	 despite	 different	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good	 life.147	 Yet,	 due	 to	
unavoidable	disagreement	among	people,	it	would	be	unjustifiable	to	base	liberal	political	





145	 Specifically,	 although	 Larmore	 thinks	 that	 Rawls’s	 point	 that	 “our	 total	 experience,	 which	
shapes	how	we	assess	the	evidence	and	weigh	values,	is	likely	in	complex	modern	societies	to	be	












This	 brings	 me	 to	 Larmore’s	 conception	 of	 neutrality.	 Larmore	 advocates	 a	 similar	








the	norms	of	 rational	dialogue	and	equal	 respect.	Rational	dialogue	 implies	 that	when	




follows	Rawls’s	 criterion	of	 reciprocity	 and	argues	 that	political	principles	must	be	 as	
justifiable	to	others	as	they	are	to	oneself.	Accordingly,	he	concludes	that	as	these	norms	
are	 not	 based	 on	 any	 particular	 conception	 of	 the	 good	 and	 are	 thus	 acceptable	 for	


















life	 that	 characterizes	 modern	 societies.”153	 That	 is	 why	 he	 advocates	 the	 internal	
conception	of	liberalism,	which	deems	pluralism	to	be	a	consequence	of	liberalism	itself.	
Quong	claims	that	as	liberal	principles	allow	citizens	to	think,	speak,	and	associate	freely,	
they	 themselves	 engender	 pluralism	 and	 disagreement.154	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Quong	
asserts	that	liberal	principles	cannot	be	justified	to	those	who	have	not	already	accepted	
the	foundational	liberal	values	that	enable	such	“thinking,	speaking	and	associating,”	that	
is,	 those	 who	 are	 illiberal	 or	 unreasonable.	 Therefore,	 Quong	 calls	 for	 a	 certain	
idealization.	 He	 argues	 that	 when	 justifying	 liberalism,	 we	 cannot	 rely	 on	 the	 actual	
constituency	(where	at	 least	part	of	 it	may	not	accept	basic	 liberal	values),	but	on	 the	
idealized	 constituency	 of	 a	 well-ordered	 liberal	 society	 characterized	 by	 reasonable	
pluralism	or	disagreement.	In	this	context,	Quong	follows	Rawls	and	argues	that	a	well-
ordered	society	is	one	where	1)	everyone	accepts	–	and	knows	that	others	accept	–	some	






judgment.157	 Considering	 the	 burdens	 of	 judgment	 as	 a	 condition	 of	 reasonableness,	
Quong	denies	the	accusation	that	political	liberals	cannot	explain	the	priority	of	justice	

























people	 cannot	 avoid.	 Consequently,	 they	 seek	 to	 legitimize	 political	 power	 in	 such	
conditions.	When	focusing	solely	on	the	political	sphere,	they	reject	not	only	the	idea	that	
the	state	should	actively	pursue	some	ideals	or	ways	of	life	on	grounds	related	to	their	
inherent	 values,	 but	 also	 the	 notion	 that	 political	 power	 should	 rely	 on	 one	
comprehensive	moral	ideal	as	the	basis	of	its	legitimization.	By	way	of	introducing	non-
comprehensive	non-perfectionist	(thus	solely	political)	liberalism,	I	have	finally	come	to	





























equally	 important	 for	an	appropriate	understanding	of	 the	 liberal	political	 community	
and	its	character.	But	this	 is	not	the	only	reason	I	argue	that	they	should	be	examined	


















Having	depicted	 the	genealogy	of	 the	 impact	of	pluralism	on	 liberal	political	 theory	as	
such,	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	 will	 now	 consider	 only	 the	 political	 (non-comprehensive	 non-






argue	 that	 searching	 for	 an	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 is	 an	 unavoidable	 step	 for	 public	
reason	 liberalism	 and	 its	 conception	 of	 political	 community.	 I	 will	 also	 contend,	
nonetheless,	 that	 by	 focusing	 exclusively	 on	 justifying	 the	 exercise	 of	 political	 power,	
public	 reason	 liberalism	 overlooks	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 character	 of	 a	 (liberal)	 political	
community	 is	also	 influenced	by	other	 factors	related	 to	pluralism.	 I	call	 the	 level	 that	
public	reason	liberalism	fails	to	notice	the	societal	level	(if	I	borrow	Kymlicka’s	term);	this	
level	 reflects	 the	 actual	 public	 character	 of	 a	 particular	 political	 community	 given	 the	
differences	among	people	as	a	 consequence	of	 their	membership	 in	particular	groups.	
Accordingly,	 I	will	argue	that	since	there	may	be	huge	 inequalities	among	people	even	
after	the	process	of	justifying	political	power,	public	reason	liberalism	does	not	deal	with	




citizens	 (as	 a	 form	of	 justice)	 given	pluralism	and	 the	differences	 among	people	 (as	 a	
result	of	their	membership	in	different	groups)	at	the	societal	 level.	Consequently,	as	I	
argue	that	respect	is	a	universal	principle,	I	challenge	the	assumption	that	it	is	enough	for	





































The	 argument	 from	 liberty	 shows	 that	 the	 reason	 that	 the	 very	 exercise	 of	 power	 is	
coercive	is	that	it	potentially	disrespects	people’s	natural	liberty.	The	same	reason	also	
explains	 the	badness,	 undesirability,	 and	 illegitimacy	of	unjustified	 coercion;	 it	 is	 thus	
respect	for	people	and	their	liberty	that	requires	that	interference	with	any	individual’s	
will	must	always	be	justified.	Such	an	argument	then	applies	to	both	moral	and	political	
levels.	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 moral	 level,	 Stanley	 Benn	 is	 probably	 the	 most	 prominent	















The	 recognition	 of	 authority	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 shared	 rules	 of	 social	 morality	 that	 Gaus	
considers	to	be	an	assumption.	He	argues	that	social	morality	is	a	system	of	moral	requirements	
determining	when	one	is	accountable	to	others.	In	social	morality,	one	must	necessarily	respect	
others	 as	 free	 and	 equal.	 Therefore,	 Gaus	 argues	 that	 respect	 for	 people	 is	 not	 a	 grounding	




summonses	 in	 social	morality	 in	G,	 implies	 that	 ii)	R	 is	publicly	 justified	 and	 iii)	 appeals	 to	R	
categorically	 respect	 everyone	 in	 G	 as	 a	 free	 and	 equal	moral	 person.	 Only	 if	 each	 person	 is	
respected	 does	 social	 morality	 possess	 legitimate	 authority.”	 Gaus,	 “Respect	 for	 Persons	 and	
Public	Justification,”	pp.	1–23.	










almost	 all	 of	 us	 understand	 ourselves	 as	 natural	 persons	 living	 in	 a	world	 of	 natural	
persons.169	Still,	the	bare	awareness	of	others	as	natural	persons	says	nothing	about	our	
commitment	 to	others	and	 the	appreciation	of	 their	 capability	 to	generate	reasons	 for	
actions,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 forbearance.170	 Benn	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 reactive	
feelings171	 that	 makes	 mutual	 commitments	 among	 people	 possible;	 reactive	 feelings	
enable	 people	 to	 recognize	 others	 as	 free	 causal	 agents	 and	 conceivers	 of	 their	 own	
projects	who	should	not	be	deprived	of	their	liberty	by	subordinating	them	to	the	goals	of	
others.172	











interferer,	 not	 the	 person	 interfered	with.174	 That	 is	 precisely	why	Betty	 is	 obliged	 to	

































a	constitution	 the	essentials	of	which	all	 citizens	as	 free	and	equal	may	reasonably	be	
expected	 to	 endorse	 in	 the	 lights	 of	 principles	 and	 ideals	 acceptable	 to	 their	 common	
human	reason.”179	He	simultaneously	 interconnects	 this	principle	with	 the	criterion	of	
reciprocity,	 asserting	 that	 “our	 exercise	 of	 political	 power	 is	 proper	 only	 when	 we	
sincerely	believe	that	the	reason	we	would	offer	for	our	political	actions	are	sufficient,	
and	 we	 also	 reasonably	 think	 that	 other	 citizens	 might	 also	 reasonably	 accept	 those	
reasons.”180	 As	 a	 result,	 political	 power	 that	 is	 not	 reasonably	 acceptable	 to	 everyone	
denies	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	and	thus	lacks	legitimacy.	Hence,	if	coercive	political	










disrespects	 her	 ability	 to	 act	 freely	 and	 accept	 only	 decisions	 that	 she	 herself	 agrees	
with.181	When	elaborating	on	Rawls’s	principle	of	legitimacy,	Charles	Larmore	shifts	the	
argumentation	 about	 the	 justification	 of	 coercion	 to	 a	 more	 general	 idea	 of	 respect	




adds	 that	 “to	 respect	 another	person	 as	 an	 end	 is	 to	 require	 that	 coercive	or	political	
























principle	 of	 respect	 for	 persons.	 Gaus,	 The	 Order	 of	 Public	 Reason,	 p.	 341;	 Gaus,	 “Liberal	
Neutrality,”	p.	139.	See	also	Lister,	Public	Reason	and	Political	Community,	pp.	67–79.	
186	Rawls,	Justice	as	Fairness,	p.	44.		






the	 argument	 from	 liberty	 falls	 into	 a	 more	 general	 idea	 of	 respect	 for	 persons,	 it	 is	




–	public	 reason	 liberalism	simultaneously	encounters	a	serious	problem.	For	how	 is	 it	
possible	that	even	after	the	process	of	justifying	the	exercise	of	political	power	there	still	
remain	many	people	in	an	unequal	and	disrespected	position	within	a	particular	political	
community?	 What	 I	 have	 in	 mind	 is	 the	 so-called	 societal	 level	 as	 –	 apart	 from	 the	
essentially	 political	 level	 I	 have	 been	 describing	 so	 far	 –	 another	 formative	 level	
determining	the	character	of	a	political	community.189	
2.2.	The	societal	level:	Struggles	for	recognition	as	struggles	for	respect	
Originally,	 the	 criticism	 that	 despite	 ensuring	 respect	 at	 the	 essentially	 political	 level	
(where	the	question	of	the	justification	of	the	exercise	of	political	power	is	addressed)	
there	 are	 still	 plenty	 of	 people	who	 are	 unequal	 and	 disrespected	was	 articulated	 by	
multiculturalism,	 which	 is	 closely	 associated	 with	 identity	 politics,	 the	 politics	 of	
difference,	and	the	politics	of	recognition.190	The	central	claim	in	this	respect	is	that	the	
dominant	 liberal	political	order	and	 its	culture	are	oppressive	since	they	disadvantage	










192	 See	 also	 Gutman,	 Identity	 in	 Democracy;	 Levy,	 Multiculturalism	 of	 Fear;	 Modood,	







fact	 inhospitable	 to	 differences	 as	 it	 promotes	 the	 uniform	 application	 of	 rules	 and	 is	
suspicious	 of	 collective	 goals.	 Unlike	 liberal	 politics,	 the	 politics	 of	 recognition	 is,	
according	to	him,	based	on	an	assumption	about	the	good	life.	It	is	grounded	in	judgments	
in	which	the	integrity	of	cultures	has	an	important	place.	Although	it	accepts	the	defense	
of	 certain	rights,	 it	 also	emphasizes	a	broad	range	of	 immunities	and	presumptions	 in	




people’s	 lives	 as	 Taylor	 claims	 that	 individual	 identity	 is	 inevitably	 connected	 with	
recognition.	 According	 to	 Taylor,	 our	 identity	 is	 always	 defined	 dialogically	 and	 is	
dependent	on	the	act	of	recognition	performed	by	other	people.	Hence,	a	person	(or	a	
group	of	people)	can	suffer	real	damage	if	others	overlook	or	demean	her.	Taylor	claims	
that	 “nonrecognition	 or	misrecognition	 can	 inflict	 harm,	 can	 be	 a	 form	 of	 oppression,	
imprisoning	someone	in	a	false,	distorted,	and	reduced	mode	of	being.”195	Consequently,	
he	distinguishes	between	two	levels	of	the	discourse	of	recognition.	First	is	the	intimate	
sphere,	 where	 the	 formation	 of	 identity	 depends	 on	 dialogue	 and	 struggles	 with	
significant	others.	Second	is	the	public	sphere	where	identity	is	formed	in	open	dialogue,	














not	been	 taken	 into	account	among	 liberals.	 In	 fact,	Taylor’s	 critique	 (and	 the	critique	
offered	by	multiculturalism	 in	general198)	has	had	an	 impact	on	 liberal	 theory	and	has	
helped	to	develop	a	specific	branch	of	liberalism,	so-called	liberal	multiculturalism.	Will	





culture	 that	 provides	 such	 a	 context	 of	 choice.201	 Kymlicka	 also	 asserts	 that	 societal	
culture	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 people’s	 self-identities.	He	 agrees	with	 the	 argument	 of	
Margalit	 and	 Raz,	 who	 contend	 that	 culture	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 anchor	 for	 people’s	 self-




defense	of	 group-differentiated	 rights	 that	would	 reflect	 an	 individual’s	 bond	with	his	
societal	culture	and	that	would	simultaneously	enable	people	to	fulfill	their	identity.204	







198	 See	 also	 Benhabib,	The	 Claims	 of	 Culture;	 Gutmann,	 Identity	 in	 Democracy;	Modood,	 “Anti-













into	 the	 majority	 society	 because	 it	 was	 their	 own	 choice	 to	 join	 a	 new	 political	
community.205	However,	my	aim	is	not	to	address	the	issue	of	minority	rights	as	a	way	to	
redress	inequalities	and	injustice.	I	only	want	to	follow	the	argument	about	the	existence	
of	 a	 dominant	 culture	 ruling	 the	 societal	 sphere	 of	 a	 political	 community	 that	 may	
disadvantage	 (disrespect)	 certain	 groups	 of	 people,	 and	 use	 it	 in	 connection	with	 the	
claim	from	the	previous	part	of	this	chapter:	that	the	principle	of	respect	is	the	default	
moral	principle	explaining	the	need	to	justify	the	exercise	of	political	power.	Accordingly,	
I	 ask	 whether	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 respect	 people	 only	 partially.	 In	 other	 words,	 is	 it	 in	
conformity	 with	 the	 very	 justification	 of	 political	 power	 explained	 by	 means	 of	 the	
principle	 of	 respect	 to	 have	 some	 people	 disrespected	 within	 a	 particular	 political	
community	even	after	such	a	process?	
As	 to	 the	 posed	 question,	 I	 argue	 that,	 concerning	 the	 justification	 of	 the	 exercise	 of	
political	power,	it	is	not	enough	for	respect	to	be	ensured	only	at	the	essentially	political	





that	 liberal	 political	 order	 is	 oppressive,	 since	 it	 disadvantages	 and	 subsequently	
misrecognizes	 certain	 people;	 this	 misrecognition	 stems	 from	 the	 false	 notion	 of	 the	
difference-blind	 and	neutral	 ground	of	 liberalism.	 Specifically,	 I	will	 point	 to	 so-called	
struggles	for	recognition.	The	reason	I	consider	such	struggles	to	be	significant	consists	
in	 the	 fact	 that	 –	 as	 Heyes	 argues	 –	 groups	 and	 political	 movements	 striving	 for	
recognition	base	their	argumentation	on	shared	experiences	of	the	injustices	that	have	
been	done	to	them:	they	advert	to	historical	injustices	related	to	structural	inequalities	
















authority	 and	 accountability:	 when	 being	 accountable,	 people	 give	 each	 other	 the	
authority	to	address	demands	to	one	another.209	The	addresser	and	addressee	thus	have	
a	 reciprocal	 relationship	 that	 they	 should	 be	 aware	 of.210	 This	 influences	 the	 very	
character	of	the	claims,	for	they	ensue	from	the	relationship	between	the	addresser	and	
addressee	when	they	reason	and	deliberate	together	and	when	both	of	them	recognize	
the	other	 as	 a	 “you”	 to	whom	she	 is	 “you”	 in	 return.	 In	other	words,	 these	 are	 claims	
providing	each	other	with	second-person	reasons	for	action	based	on	the	relationship	of	
authority	 and	 accountability	 between	 the	 addresser	 and	 addressee.	 Accordingly,	 the	
second-person	engagement	between	the	addresser	and	addressee	commits	both	parties	
to	seeing	their	relationship	as	governed	by	their	standing	as	equals.211	




as	 equal	 members	 of	 a	 moral	 community	 that	 enables	 them	 to	 hold	 one	 another	
accountable	 for	 compliance	 with	 norms	 determining	 relations	 between	 them.	
Consequently,	when	someone	respects	another	person,	she	in	fact	respects	his	dignity	as	













the	 object	 of	 which	 is	 not	 dignity	 but	 rather	 excellence	 or	 merit.214	 Darwall	 deems	
recognition	 respect	 to	 be	 a	 pro-attitude	 as	 it	 is	 “the	 disposition	 to	 give	 appropriate	
consideration	to	the	object	of	respect	in	moral	deliberation	and	action.”215	Therefore,	the	
response	 to	disrespect	–	as	a	violation	of	dignity	–	 is	a	 reactive	attitude216	demanding	
recognition	of	dignity	(and	thus	respect).217	As	for	reactive	attitudes,	Darwall	touches	on	
the	same	thing	as	Benn218	when	speaking	about	reactive	feelings.	However,	contrary	to	




Carla	Bagnoli	 and	Elisabetta	Galeotti	 further	develop	Darwall’s	 approach.	Bagnoli	 also	
associates	 moral	 relations	 with	 the	 assumption	 of	 second-person	 authority	 and	
accountability.	Bagnoli	argues	that	morality	as	mutual	accountability	means	that	“when	
we	enter	a	moral	relation	we	offer	and	demand	reasons	of	justification	because	we	hold	
each	 other	 responsible	 for	 what	 we	 do.”219	 From	 such	 a	 relation	 of	 reciprocal	 –	 thus	
second-person	–	accountability,	Bagnoli	then	deduces	her	understanding	of	respect.	She	





















in	 virtue	 of	 a	 third-person	 morality;	 by	 this,	 Galeotti	 means	 either	 “a	 second-person	
instantiation	 of	 a	 general	 duty,	 or	 the	 (second-person)	 application	 of	 the	 universal	
principle	(hence	third-person)	of	human	dignity.”221	What	she	considers	to	be	particularly	
problematic	 in	 Darwall’s	 theory	 is	 that	 despite	 the	 respect–recognition	 link,	 Darwall	
simultaneously	displays	 respect	 in	 terms	of	 rights	 and	duties.	 Specifically,	 he	makes	 a	












Yet	 she	 argues	 that	 while	 Bagnoli’s	 conception	 of	 recognition	 concerns	 the	 source	 of	
normativity,	her	conception	concerns	the	person	as	a	center	of	moral	worth	that	–	as	she	
asserts	 –	 commands	 reciprocal	 respect.223	 Accordingly,	 Galeotti	 argues	 that	 although	
respect	 is	 a	 universal	 claim	 of	 everyone,	 it	 can	 only	 be	 expressed	 indirectly	 through	
something	else	that	signifies	it.	Respect	thus	always	requires	an	attitude	of	regard	that	
accompanies	 the	 very	 act	 specifying	 respect;	 it	 is	 this	 attitude	 that	makes	 the	 act	 the	
proper	 response	 to	 the	 claim	 to	 be	 respected.	 In	 other	 words,	 according	 to	 Galeotti,	








Galeotti	 contends	 that	 contemporary	 claims	 to	 recognition	 of	 difference	 within	 the	
politics	of	recognition	are	a	proper	example	of	such	a	relationship	between	respect	and	















to	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 previous	 section,	 respect	 is	 the	 universal	 moral	 principle	
underlying	the	political	community	as	a	whole.	If	it	is	so,	however,	how	is	it	then	possible	
that	achieving	respect	at	the	essentially	political	level	does	not	imply	respect	also	at	the	
societal	 level?	 How	 is	 it	 possible	 that	 there	 are	many	 disrespected	 people,	 even	 after	













between	 interpretations	 of	 such	 respect	 at	 both	 levels.	 To	 be	more	 specific,	 whereas	
Darwall,	 Bagnoli,	 and	 Galeotti	 hold	 the	 second-person	 form	 of	 recognition	 respect,	
assuming	 that	 respect	 can	 only	 be	 achieved	 through	 an	 attitude	 of	 regard	 –	 an	
individualizing	act	of	recognition	of	me	by	you	as	your	equal229	–	respect	at	the	essentially	
political	level	has	the	third-person	form.230	When	justifying	the	exercise	of	political	power,	























230	 However	 –	 as	 it	was	mentioned	 –	Galeotti	 claims	 that	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day,	 even	Darwall	




To	 conclude	 this	 chapter,	 I	will	 summarize	 the	 argumentation	 I	 have	proposed	 so	 far.	
When	focusing	on	political	–	public	reason	–	liberalism,	I	have	claimed	that,	in	order	to	
understand	 the	 character	 of	 a	 liberal	 political	 community	 under	 the	 conditions	 of	
pluralism	appropriately,	not	only	the	essentially	political	level	concerning	the	justification	




























community	 must	 take	 into	 account	 when	 dealing	 with	 the	 fact	 of	 pluralism,	 in	 the	
forthcoming	 chapter	 I	will	 focus	 in	more	detail	 on	 the	 essentially	political	 level:	 I	will	
reflect	on	the	claim	that	the	exercise	of	political	power	must	be	justified	to	all	who	are	to	
be	coerced,	where	the	purpose	of	justifying	the	exercise	of	coercion	is	respect	for	persons.	





though	 I	 will	 partially	 accept	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 overly	 demanding	 character	 of	 the	
conception	 of	 reasonableness	 –	 which	 concerns	 the	 requirement	 for	 reasonable	
comprehensive	doctrines	in	particular	–	at	the	same	time,	however,	I	will	show	that	both	














face	of	new	 information	and	 criticism	by	others.235	 In	 this	 context,	Vallier	 asserts	 that	
although	 not	 everyone	must	 share	 Gaus’s	 entire	 account	 of	 epistemic	 justification,	 all	
public	reason	liberals	should	accept	its	access	internalism,236	assuming	that	“whenever	
one	is	entitled	to	affirm	reason	R,	one	can	become	aware	by	reflection	of	all	(or	at	least	







justified	 when	 each	 member	 of	 the	 public	 has	 sufficient	 reason	 to	 endorse	 it.238	
Considering	 this,	 there	 is	 a	variety	of	 forms	of	 sufficiency.	 Specifically,	Vallier	outlines	













236	 Internalism	 is	 one	 way	 of	 epistemic	 justification;	 the	 second	 one	 is	 externalism.	 While	
internalism	claims	that	justification	is	only	determined	by	factors	that	are	internal	to	a	person,	
externalism	asserts	that	justification	depends	on	additional	factors	external	to	a	person.	Access	





































the	 very	 form	 of	 “qualification.”	 He	 objects	 to	 overinclusion	 and	 overexclusion.	 According	 to	
Estlund,	 the	 overinclusion	 objection	 claims	 that	 the	 qualified	 acceptability	 criterion	 enables	
doctrines	that	should	be	admissible	in	political	justification	to	be	defeated	by	false	views.	He	states	
that	 “by	 including	 […]	 a	 range	 of	 incompatible,	 and	 so	 often	 false,	 views	 inside	 the	 circle	 of	
qualified	and	decisive	objections,	 the	qualified	acceptability	 requirement	 is	 too	 inclusive.”	The	
overexclusion	objection	 then	asserts	 that	 the	qualified	acceptability	 criterion	 is	 too	 restrictive	







are	 radical	 as	 there	 are	 actual	 objections	 to	 almost	 everything	 too.	Therefore,	 even	 the	actual	
acceptance	 view	might	 imply	 that	 almost	 no	 law	would	 ever	 be	 legitimate.	However,	 Estlund	
accepts	that	such	a	claim	is	not	decisive.	Specifically,	he	refers	to	the	context	of	sex	as	a	situation	





qualified.	 The	most	 familiar	 version	 of	 qualified	 acceptability	 is	 Rawls’s	 conception	 of	
reasonableness:	all	qualified	points	of	view	are	indeed	all	reasonable	points	of	view.243	I	




within	 his/her	 diverse	 comprehensive	 doctrine	 a	 political	 conception	 of	 justice	 and	
knows	(is	assured)	that	all	others	have	done	the	same	thing.245	The	resulting	“overlapping	



















243	 A	 somewhat	 less	 idealized	 version	 of	 reasonableness	 is	 then	 proposed	 by	 Gaus.	 His	
constituency	comprises	members	of	the	public;	 they	are	not	so	idealized	that	their	reasoning	is	
inaccessible	 to	 their	 real-world	 counterparts.	 They	 hold	 the	 beliefs	 that	 their	 real-world	
counterparts	 would	 be	 justified	 in	 holding	 after	 engaging	 in	 a	 respectable	 amount	 of	 good	
reasoning.	Gaus,	The	Order	of	Public	Reason,	pp.	250–277.	See	also	Quong,	“Public	Reason.”	
244	 Rawls,	 Political	 Liberalism,	 pp.	 48–54.	 See	 also	 Boettcher,	 “What	 Is	
Reasonableness?”;	Weithman,	Why	Political	Liberalism?,	pp.	273–287.	
245	See	the	first	chapter. 




underlying	the	desire	to	engage	 in	 fair	cooperation	with	others.248	Apart	 from	the	first	
dimension	of	the	reasonableness	of	persons,	which	implies	their	willingness	to	propose	
fair	 terms	 of	 cooperation	 and	 abide	 by	 them	 if	 others	 do	 so	 too,	 Rawls	mentions	 the	
second	–	epistemic	–	aspect	consisting	in	the	burdens	of	judgment	as	an	epistemological	
tool	 explaining	 the	 inevitability	 of	 reasonable	 disagreement.249	 They	 –	 as	 “the	 many	
hazards	involved	in	the	correct	(and	conscientious)	exercise	of	our	powers	of	reason	and	
judgment	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 political	 life”250	 –	 explain	 why	 reasonable	 people	









within	 some	 range	 (not	 sharply	 specifiable)	where	 reasonable	 persons	may	
differ.	




of	 labor,	 its	 many	 social	 groups	 and	 their	 ethnic	 variety,	 citizens’	 total	










world	 of	 others	 and	 stand	 ready	 to	 propose,	 or	 to	 accept,	 as	 the	 case	 may	 be,	 fair	 terms	 of	
cooperation	with	them.	These	terms	specify	the	reasons	we	are	to	share	and	publicly	recognize	
before	one	another	as	grounding	our	social	relations.	Insofar	as	we	are	reasonable,	we	are	ready	
to	work	out	the	 framework	for	the	public	social	world,	a	 framework	 it	 is	reasonable	to	expect	
everyone	to	endorse	and	act	on,	provided	others	can	be	relied	on	to	do	the	same.	If	we	cannot	rely	


















Put	 otherwise,	 a	 reasonable	 comprehensive	 doctrine	 exercises	 both	 theoretical	 and	
practical	 reason	 in	 formulating	 a	 coherent,	 consistent,	 and	 intelligible	 account	 of	 the	
major	religious,	philosophical,	and	moral	aspects	of	life.	










the	 reasonable	 person.	 He	 claims	 that	 it	 grounds	 “the	 meanings	 of	 all	 Rawls’s	 other	
‘reasonable’	 terms.”254	 Accordingly,	 Wenar	 identifies	 five	 attributes	 of	 the	 Rawlsian	











will	 likewise	 do	 so;	 3.)	 recognition	 of	 the	 burdens	 of	 judgment;	 4.)	 reasonable	moral	
psychology;	 and	 5.)	 recognition	 of	 the	 five	 essential	 elements	 of	 a	 conception	 of	
objectivity.255	Following	the	assumption	that	the	reasonableness	of	person(s)	determines	
other	levels	of	reasonableness,	Wenar	claims	that	in	order	to	be	considered	as	reasonable,	
any	 comprehensive	 doctrine	 must	 acknowledge	 that	 reasonable	 persons	 have	 the	
aforementioned	 attributes.256	 However,	 this	 is	 precisely	 what	 Wenar	 deems	 to	 be	
problematic	because,	according	to	him,	particularly	attributes	3	to	5	are	too	demanding	
for	doctrines.	With	regard	to	the	attribute	of	the	burdens	of	judgment,	he	claims	that	they	
disqualify	 firm	 religious	 faiths	 from	 being	 reasonable	 as	 they	 cannot	 fulfill	 all	 the	
assumptions	of	the	burdens	of	judgment.	Considering	the	attribute	concerning	reasonable	
moral	 psychology,	 Wenar	 argues	 that	 “the	 conception	 of	 the	 person	 underlying	 the	
reasonable	 moral	 psychology	 conflicts	 with	 the	 conception	 to	 other	 philosophical	
theories.”	Hence,	it	also	precludes	many	comprehensive	doctrines	from	being	reasonable.	
Finally,	regarding	the	five	essential	elements	of	a	conception	of	objectivity,	Wenar	asserts	
that	 as	 they	 “exclude	 prevalent	 accounts	 of	 the	 sources	 of	 normative	 authority,”	 they,	
again,	prevent	many	comprehensive	doctrines	from	being	reasonable.257	Following	this,	
Wenar	claims	that	since	political	liberalism	in	fact	gets	by	employing	only	attributes	1	and	
2,	 to	make	political	 liberalism	 less	expansive	–	and	 to	secure	 the	viability	of	 justice	as	
fairness	 as	 a	 political	 conception	 –	 we	 should	 discard	 elements	 3,	 4,	 and	 5	 from	 the	
definition	of	reasonable	persons.	
 







circumstances.”	 The	 fourth	 essential	 is	 that	 “a	 conception	 of	 objectivity	 must	 distinguish	 the	
objective	 point	 of	 view	 –	 as	 given,	 say,	 by	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 certain	 appropriately	 defined	









reasonableness	 as	 employed	 here)	 and	 argue	 that	 relying	 on	 both	 political	 and	
philosophical	 reasonableness	 leads	 to	 an	 overly	 narrow	 conception	 of	 toleration	 as	 it	
excludes	too	many	people	from	the	process	of	public	justification.258	What	they	consider	
to	 be	 particularly	 questionable	 is	 the	 requirement	 for	 philosophical	 reasonableness,	
which	is,	according	to	them,	overly	excessive	and	may	cause	the	exclusion	of	otherwise	
(i.e.,	 politically)	 reasonable	 people	 from	 public	 deliberation	 solely	 due	 to	 their	
unreasonable	 comprehensive	doctrines.259	Accordingly,	 they	assert	 that	 in	order	 to	be	
less	 restrictive,	 political	 liberalism	 should	 abandon	 the	 requirement	 of	 philosophical	
(epistemological)	reasonableness	and	stick	solely	to	political	reasonableness.260	
Finally,	Martha	Nussbaum	also	argues	 that	 the	reasonableness	of	persons	grounds	 the	
reasonableness	of	comprehensive	doctrines	and	hence	that	the	character	of	the	latter	is	
determined	by	 the	 former.	Again,	 employing	 slightly	 different	 terminology,	Nussbaum	
distinguishes	 between	 ethical	 and	 epistemic	 reasonableness,	 the	 former	 consisting	
primarily	in	the	assumption	of	equal	respect	shared	by	a	diversity	of	people.	Interestingly,	
Nussbaum	concedes	that	the	burdens	of	judgment	may	be	interpreted	in	the	ethical	sense,	
implying	 that	as	 long	as	reasonable	citizens	do	not	 try	 to	 impose	 their	comprehensive	
doctrines	 through	 law,	 they	 exhibit	 respect	 to	 their	 fellow	 citizens.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
however,	 she	 sees	 burdens	 of	 judgment	 closely	 associated	 with	 the	 epistemic	












sense	of	 the	 term	 (they	 continually	 educate	 themselves,	 are	willing	 to	 engage	 in	 conversation	
rather	 than	 violence	 to	 resolve	 disputes,	 etc.)	 and	 even	 the	 “smartest,	 nicest	 people”	 around.	
Unfortunately,	 they	 have	 this	 pathological	 trait	 of	 believing	 in	 the	 truth	 of	 their	 doctrine	 and	




reasonable	 comprehensive	 doctrines.261	 Not	 only	 does	 the	 requirement	 of	
reasonableness,	as	applied	to	comprehensive	doctrines,	render	many	ethically	reasonable	
citizens	excluded	from	public	justification,	but	it	may	also	lead,	in	her	view,	to	undesirable	
perfectionism.262	 Therefore,	 although	 Nussbaum	 is	 willing	 to	 accept	 the	 role	 of	 the	
burdens	of	judgment	within	the	ethical	understanding	of	reasonableness,	she	argues	that	
the	epistemic	interpretation	of	the	burdens	of	judgment	undermines	the	whole	project	of	
political	 liberalism,	 precisely	 because	 it	 brings	 Rawls	 uncomfortably	 close	 to	 the	
perfectionist	position.263	She	believes	that	political	liberalism	can	afford	to	rely	on	ethical	
reasonableness	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	 respect,	 which	 is	why	 the	 burdens	 of	
judgment	should	be	abandoned.264	
To	 sum	 up	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 overly	 demanding	 nature	 of	 Rawls’s	 conception	 of	




comprehensive	 doctrines	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 epistemic	 reasonableness	 of	 persons	
(which	 is	 also	 the	 presumption	 of	 Rawls	 himself),	 they	 claim	 that	 in	 order	 to	 be	 less	
restrictive	 –	 to	 enable	 more	 comprehensive	 doctrines	 to	 become	 part	 of	 public	
justification	 –	 we	 should	 give	 up	 the	 demand	 for	 the	 epistemic	 (philosophical)	
reasonableness	of	persons,	the	burdens	of	judgment	in	particular.	In	fact,	they	assert	that	
political	liberalism	gets	by	only	with	ethical	(moral/political)	reasonableness,	which	–	as	





262	 She	 contends	 that	 “reasonable	 citizens	 should	 not	 be	 in	 the	 business	 of	 looking	 over	 the	












and	 can	 cause	 the	 exclusion	 of	 otherwise	 reasonable	 people	 from	 public	 justification	
merely	because	they	happen	to	hold	unreasonable	comprehensive	doctrines.	Apart	from	
this,	Wenar	and	Nussbaum	are	correct	 in	 claiming	 that	 the	 requirement	of	 reasonable	
comprehensive	doctrines	may	lead	to	undesirable	comprehensiveness	and	perfectionism,	
as	 someone	 may	 legitimately	 argue	 that	 such	 a	 requirement	 is	 based	 on	 a	
characteristically	 liberal	 point	 of	 view	 regarding	 the	 rationalistic	 and	 scientific	
requirements	on	the	structure	of	the	doctrine.265	Furthermore,	upon	closer	examination	
the	notion	of	comprehensive	doctrines	turns	out	to	be	indeterminate	because	doctrines	
differ	 in	 the	 degree	 of	 their	 comprehensiveness.	 Also,	 agents	 holding	 the	 same	
comprehensive	doctrine	may	diverge	as	 regards	 the	degree	of	 their	attachment	 to	 the	




















cannot	 in	 fact	 ensure	 respect	 for	 persons.268	 As	 I	 will	 argue,	 the	 principle	 of	 respect	
requires	both	the	moral	and	epistemic	dimensions	of	reasonableness	to	be	considered.	
To	 show	 why	 this	 is	 so,	 I	 will	 briefly	 elaborate	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 epistemic	
reasonableness	 of	 persons.	 According	 to	 Rawls,	 one	 of	 the	 roles	 of	 the	 burdens	 of	
judgment	characterizing	epistemic	reasonableness	–	and	the	exercise	of	human	reason	as	
such	–	 is	 that	they	prove	that	there	 is	genuine	normative	disagreement	that	cannot	be	
overcome.269	R.	 J.	Leland	and	Han	van	Wietmarschen	call	 it	universal	disagreement	and	
argue	 that	 such	 a	 disagreement	 is	 an	 inevitable	 consequence	 of	 our	 limited	 cognitive	
(epistemic)	capacities	that	persist	even	among	the	most	competent	people.270	Fabienne	
Peter	talks	about	the	opacity	view,	according	to	which	reasonable	disagreement	is	bound	
to	 persist	 even	 after	 citizens	 have	 each	 responded	 to	 the	 fact	 of	 disagreement	 among	
themselves	and	adjusted	their	beliefs;	reasonable	disagreement	thus	remains	in	existence	











270	 Leland	 and	 van	 Wietmarschen,	 “Reasonableness,	 Intellectual	 Modesty,	 and	 Reciprocity	 in	
Political	Justification,”	pp.	731–732.	




272	 Leland	 and	 van	 Wietmarschen,	 “Reasonableness,	 Intellectual	 Modesty,	 and	 Reciprocity	 in	
Political	 Justification,”	pp.	731–732;	Peter,	 “Epistemic	Foundations	of	Political	Liberalism,”	pp.	





By	 emphasizing	 the	 insurmountable	 nature	 of	 disagreement	 among	 people	 on	 the	
grounds	of	the	very	exercise	of	their	reasoning,	the	epistemic	aspect	of	reasonableness	




cannot	 adequately	 take	 into	 consideration	 pluralism	within	 people’s	 reasoning.	 To	 be	
more	 specific,	 a	 solely	moral	 conception	of	 reasonableness	 does	not	 impose	 sufficient	
limits	 on	 what	 reasonable	 people	 can	 expect	 their	 fellow	 citizens	 to	 accept.274	 The	








extends	 it.	 Specifically,	 he	 adds	 that	 epistemic	 peerhood	 is	 also	 defined	 by	 familiarity	 with	






also	 claims	 that	 epistemic	 peers	 are	 those	 who	 are	 equally	 likely	 to	make	mistakes.	 Gutting,	
Religious	 Belief	 and	 Religious	 Scepticism,	 pp.	 82–83;	 Kelly,	 “The	 Epistemic	 Significance	 of	
Disagreement,”	p.	168;	Christensen,	“Epistemology	of	Disagreement:	The	Good	News,”	pp.	187–
217;	 Elga,	 “Reflection	 and	 Disagreement,”	 p.	 487;	 Simpson,	 “Epistemic	 Peerhood	 and	 the	
Epistemology	of	Disagreement,”	p.	563;	Peter,	“Epistemic	Foundations	of	Political	Liberalism,”	pp.	
598–620.	See	also	Liveriero,	“The	Epistemic	Dimension	of	Reasonableness,”	p.	523.	
274	 Leland	 and	 van	 Wietmarschen,	 “Reasonableness,	 Intellectual	 Modesty,	 and	 Reciprocity	 in	
Political	Justification,”	p.	724.	
275	At	the	same	time,	however,	insisting	on	the	epistemic	reasonableness	of	persons	does	not	force	
us	 to	 accept	 Rawls’s	 three	 criteria	 of	 reasonable	 comprehensive	 doctrines.	 People	 are	 not	




strange	 –	 for	 instance,	 one	 that	 believes	 that	 aliens	 have	 invaded	 Earth	 –	 and	 qualifies	 as	
unreasonable	 according	 to	 Rawls’s	 criteria	 (since	 it	 may	 lack	 coherence,	 be	 impervious	 to	
 66	
Apart	 from	 insufficient	 sensitivity	 to	 pluralism,	 exclusive	 concern	 with	 the	 moral	
reasonableness	 of	 persons	 also	 overlooks	 that	 the	 requirement	 for	 their	 epistemic	
reasonableness	 is	 –	 similarly	 to	 the	 demand	 for	 moral	 reasonableness	 –	 crucial	 for	
respecting	people.	Here,	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	comes	into	play	as	it	helps	to	explain	
how	 abandoning	 the	 epistemic	 element	 of	 reasonableness	 potentially	 collides	 with	
respect	 for	 persons.276	 Following	 Rawls’s	 principle	 of	 legitimacy,	 the	 criterion	 of	
reciprocity	 states	 that	 in	 order	 to	 respect	 persons,	 citizens	must	 only	 appeal	 to	 those	
arguments	 that	 other	 citizens	 can	 reasonably	 accept	 when	 deliberating	 about	
fundamental	 political	 issues.	 In	 this	 regard,	 however,	 Leland	 and	 van	 Wietmarschen	
present	the	fitting	example	of	the	“rationalist	fundamentalist”	–	someone	who	is	morally	
reasonable	 yet	 does	 not	 recognize	 intellectual	 modesty.277	 Although	 such	 a	 person	 is	








epistemically	 reasonable	 in	 the	 weaker	 sense	 –	 that	 is,	 they	 may	 very	 well	 accept	 that	
disagreement	with	their	fellow	citizens	is	insurmountable	and	acknowledge	intellectual	modesty.	
Rawls,	 Political	 Liberalism,	 pp.	 133–172;	 Leland	 and	 van	 Wietmarschen,	 “Reasonableness,	
Intellectual	 Modesty,	 and	 Reciprocity	 in	 Political	 Justification,”	 p.	 722;	 Peter,	 “Epistemic	




the	 assumption	 that	 when	 making	 shared	 political	 decisions,	 citizens	 must	 refer	 only	 to	









Politics,	 p.	 141;	 Larmore,	 The	 Morals	 of	 Modernity;	 Larmore,	 “The	 Moral	 Basis	 of	 Political	
Liberalism”;	 Lister,	 Public	 Reason	 and	 Political	 Community;	 Leland	 and	 van	 Wietmarschen,	
“Political	 Liberalism	 and	 Political	 Community”;	 Weithman,	Why	 Political	 Liberalism?	 On	 John	
Rawls’s	Political	Turn;	Wenar,	“John	Rawls.”	
277	 Leland	 and	 van	 Wietmarschen,	 “Reasonableness,	 Intellectual	 Modesty,	 and	 Reciprocity	 in	
Political	Justification,”	pp.	730–731.		
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disrespected.	 The	 danger	 of	 denying	 the	 criterion	 of	 reciprocity	 is	 precisely	 why	 I	





principle	 of	 respect	 is	 understood	 as	 an	 impersonal	 (third-person)	 moral	 imperative	
embedded	in	the	right-duty	perspective.278	It	assumes	that	everyone	has	the	right	to	only	
reasonably	acceptable	arguments	being	used	in	public	deliberation.	At	the	same	time,	it	
states	 that	 everyone	 has	 the	 duty	 to	 provide	 others	 only	 with	 reasonable	 acceptable	
arguments	in	public	deliberation.	Besides	Rawls,	it	has	mainly	been	Charles	Larmore	who	
bases	his	understanding	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	on	such	respect.	In	fact,	Larmore	
has	 presented	 the	 conception	 of	 the	 third-person	 form	 of	 respect	 probably	 most	
systematically.	 Following	 the	 assumption	 that	 coercive	 political	 power	 must	 be	 as	
justifiable	 to	others	as	 it	 is	 to	us,	Larmore	argues	 that	 it	 is	precisely	 the	 imperative	of	
respect	 that	 explains	 why	 people	 must	 adhere	 only	 to	 considerations	 that	 they	 can	
reasonably	expect	all	reasonable	citizens	to	accept.279	For	if	they	forced	others	to	comply	
with	 political	 principles	 reasonably	 unacceptable	 to	 them,	 they	 would	 treat	 them	 as	





respect	 others	 as	 free	 and	 equal	 should	 refrain	 from	 deciding	 fundamental	 political	
 
278	 The	 third-person	 form	 of	 recognition	 respect	 that	 citizens	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 led	 by	 is	

































both	 the	 moral	 and	 epistemological	 reasonableness	 of	 persons,	 which	 determine	 the	
acceptability	of	coercion,	are	important,	for	not	only	do	they	adequately	allow	for	the	fact	
of	pluralism,	but	they	are	also	both	crucial	for	ensuring	the	principle	of	respect	as	such.	In	











a	political	community.	 In	 the	next	chapter,	 I	will	 thus	analyze	 the	problems	connected	
with	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	as	 interpreted	from	the	 imperative	of	respect	 in	more	















At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 I	 showed	 that	 the	 standard	 interpretation	 of	 the	
criterion	of	 reciprocity	 refers	 to	 the	principle	of	 respect	understood	as	a	 third-person	








think	 it	 is	 needed,	 they	 understand	 the	 principle	 incorrectly.	 Secondly,	 there	 is	 the	
objection	 that	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 criterion	 of	 reciprocity	 only	 by	 means	 of	 the	
argument	from	respect	for	one’s	liberty	insufficiently	takes	into	account	the	role	of	the	
political	 community.	 Along	 the	 following	 lines,	 I	 will	 discuss	 both	 objections	 in	more	
detail.	Accordingly,	I	will	call	for	a	dual	interpretation	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	when	
justifying	the	exercise	of	political	power.	I	will	contend	that	it	is	not	necessary	to	explain	
it	 solely	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 imperative	 of	 respect.	 Indeed,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 an	
interpretation	that	is	compatible	with	the	imperative	of	respect	but	that	also	takes	into	











interpreted	 from	 the	perspective	 of	 the	 imperative	 of	 respect.	 This	 criticism	 concerns	























also	 Stout,	Democracy	 and	 Tradition,	 pp.	 63–77;	 Boettcher,	 “Respect,	 Recognition,	 and	 Public	
Reason,”	pp.	234–235.	
285	Wolterstorff,	“The	Role	of	Religion	in	Decision	and	Discussion	of	Political	Issues,”	p.	111.	






requires	 public	 justification	 of	 coercion	 in	 fact	 refers	 to	 two	 different	 claims:	 to	 the	
principle	 of	 pursuit288	 and	 the	 doctrine	 of	 restraint.289	 Although	 Eberle	 advocates	 an	
obligation	to	pursue	public	justification,	he	asserts	that	it	does	not	imply	an	obligation	to	
exercise	 restraint.	 In	 other	 words,	 even	 though	 citizens	 are	 obliged	 to	 pursue	 public	
justification	for	a	coercive	 law,	they	are	not	committed	to	 leave	off	supporting	a	 law	if	
“public	justification	is	not	in	the	offing.”290	Eberle	claims	that	the	principle	of	pursuit	only	
requires	 that	 citizens	 sincerely291	 and	 conscientiously	 aspire	 to	 public	 justification.292	
Specifically,	he	points	 to	 the	 ideal	of	 conscientious	engagement293	 and	argues	 that	 if	 a	
religious	 citizen	meets	 all	 the	 assumptions	 of	 conscientious	 engagement,	 he	 does	 not	
disrespect	 others	 when	 he	 imposes	 a	 coercive	 law	 for	 which	 he	 has	 only	 a	 religious	
justification.	









upheld:	 “1)	 citizens	of	 a	 liberal	democracy	may	base	 their	votes	on	 reasons	drawn	 from	 their	
comprehensive	moral	views,	including	their	religious	views,	without	having	other	reasons	which	
are	 sufficient	 for	 their	vote	–	provided	 they	 sincerely	believe	 that	 their	government	would	be	
justified	 in	 adopting	 the	measures	 they	 vote	 for;	 2)	 citizens	 of	 a	 liberal	 democracy	may	 offer	





292	 “It	 is	entirely	silent	regarding	what	a	citizen	may	or	may	not	do	so	 long	as	she	succeeds	 in	





appropriate;	 2)	 She	will	 withhold	 support	 from	 a	 given	 coercive	 policy	 if	 she	 can’t	 acquire	 a	
sufficiently	 high	 degree	 of	 rational	 justification	 for	 the	 claim	 that	 that	 policy	 is	 morally	





294	 Constitutional	 essentials	 include	 the	principles	 that	 structure	 the	government	and	political	
process	and	the	basic	rights	and	liberties	of	citizens;	matters	of	basic	justice	involve	principles	
 73	













Gaus	 is	well	aware	of	 the	problem	of	side-lining	the	particularities,	and,	as	 I	will	show	
later,	 he	 proposes	 a	 specific	 view	 on	 public	 reason	 that	 enables	 citizens	 to	 include	
comprehensive	 arguments	 –	 and	 thus	 people’s	 particularities	 –	 in	 public	 deliberation	
under	certain	conditions.	
However,	 even	 if	 we	 accept	 the	 objection	 that	 the	 requirement	 for	 retreating	 from	
people’s	 particularities	 only	 concerns	 a	 very	 restrictive	 number	 of	 issues,	 it	 is	 still	
problematic.	For	if	I	go	back	to	the	wording	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity,	it	tells	people	




the	 heart	 of	 the	 problem,	 for	 it	 may	 be	 contended	 that	 as	 the	 very	 requirement	 for	
















optional	 that	people	 can	voluntarily	abstract	away	 from.	On	 the	 contrary,	 religion	 is	 a	
constitutive	part	 of	 people’s	 identity299	 that	 determines	who	 they	 are.300	Hence,	when	
people	are	forced	to	abstract	away	from	their	religious	beliefs	during	public	deliberation,	










said	 that	Gerald	Gaus	argues	 that	 the	 idea	of	public	 reason	does	not	apply	only	 to	 the	
 
299	The	identity	view	of	integrity	was	developed	especially	by	Bernard	Williams.	He	argues	that	




















each	other	 to	engage	 in,	 or	 refrain	 from,	 certain	 lines	of	 conduct.”303	As	 a	 result,	Gaus	
partially	 captures	 the	 problem	 I	 have	 been	 addressing:	 that	 focusing	 simply	 on	 the	
justification	 of	 political	 power	 overlooks	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 people	 may	 remain	
disrespected	 even	after	 the	 justification	process.	Apart	 from	 this,	Gaus	 also	 –	together	
with	 Kevin	 Vallier	 –	acknowledges	 the	 objections	 to	 the	 omission	 of	 differences	 and	
particularities	 during	 public	 deliberation.	 Specifically,	 Gaus	 and	 Vallier	 accept	 the	






























objections	 to	public	 reason	 liberalism.	He	mentions	1)	 the	 integrity	objection,308	2)	 the	
fairness	objection,	which	argues	that	the	doctrine	of	public	reason	is	itself	an	expression	
of	unfairness	as	 it	 subjects	 religious	 citizens	 to	 restraints	 that	 are	not	 applied	 to	non-
religious	 citizens;	 3)	 the	 denial	 of	 truth	 objection,	 which	 states	 that	 public	 reason	










need	 merely	 be	 intelligible.311	 Contrary	 to	 the	 mainstream	 view	 assuming	 that	


















The	 convergence	 view	 advocated	 by	 Gaus	 and	 Vallier	may	 be	 convincing	 to	 a	 certain	
extent:	 not	 only	 is	 Gaus’s	 theory	 of	 public	 justification	 more	 complex	 as	 it	 does	 not	
concern	 only	 the	 essentially	 political	 level,	 but	 Gaus	 and	 Vallier	 also	 respond	 to	 the	
objection	 regarding	 the	 demand	 for	 refraining	 from	 particularities	 when	 publicly	
deliberating.	Still,	despite	these	assets,	I	do	not	consider	the	convergence	approach	to	be	

















the	 laws,	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 citizens	 can	 cease	 to	 support	 the	political	 community	
unless	 they	 can	 find	 reasons	 for	 its	 laws	 that	 will	 be	 in	 conformity	 with	 their	 new	
evaluative	 standards.	 If	 they	 find	no	 such	 reasons,	 the	political	 partnership	with	 their	
fellow	 citizens	 will	 no	 longer	 hold	 good.	 This,	 nonetheless,	 means	 that	 within	 the	
 









Apart	 from	 the	 political	 community’s	 dependence	 on	 the	 stability	 of	 citizens’	 beliefs,	
Quong	claims	that	the	role	of	the	political	community	within	the	convergence	view	is	also	
weakened	due	to	the	fact	that	the	assumption	of	sincerity	is	ignored.316	Quong	considers	
this	 assumption	 to	 be	 vital	 for	 the	 political	 community.	 He	 asserts	 that	 by	 offering	
arguments	 that	 we	 sincerely	 believe	 others	 can	 accept	 as	 such,	 we	 express	 our	
relationship	with	our	political	partners	and	our	commitment	to	the	political	community.	
However,	as	the	convergence	view	denies	the	requirement	of	shared	reasons	that	enables	
reasonable	 citizens	 to	 sincerely	 believe	 that	 their	 reasons	 will	 be	 acceptable	 to	 their	
fellows,	it	also	denies	the	assumption	of	sincerity.	To	be	more	specific,	the	convergence	
view	 only	 supposes	 that	 the	 reasons	 given	 by	 citizens	 must	 be	 intelligible	 to	 others	
according	 to	 their	 own	 evaluative	 standards.317	 It	 says	 nothing	 about	 how	 sincerely	












justification	amongst	people	 adhering	 to	different	 comprehensive	doctrines	 can	only	be	made	
consistent	with	PJS	(a	principle	of	justificatory	sincerity)	provided	each	person	involved	sincerely	
believes	that	the	other	people	involved	are	justified	in	adhering	to	their	different	comprehensive	
doctrines;	2.	The	belief	 required	 in	 (1)	 is	 generally	not	possible	unless	 citizens	 accept	 certain	
epistemological	or	axiological	doctrines;	3.	The	fact	of	reasonable	pluralism	means	we	cannot	and	
should	 not	 expect	 citizens	 in	 a	 liberal	 society	 to	 adhere	 to	 any	 particular	 epistemological	 or	





The	 convergence	 approach’s	 insufficient	 consideration	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 political	
community	brings	me	to	the	second	objection	to	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	interpreted	
from	the	perspective	of	the	imperative	of	respect.	As	argued,	this	imperative	assumes	that	
















values	 of	 public	 reason.323	 Citizens	 would	 thus	 violate	 their	 obligations	 toward	 their	













Recently,	 mainly	 Kyla	 Ebels-Duggan,	 Andrew	 Lister	 and	 R.J.	 Leland,	 and	 Han	 van	
Wietmarschen	have	elaborated	an	interpretation	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	referring	
to	 the	 idea	of	 civic	 friendship.324	Although	Ebels-Duggan	disputes	whether	 the	duty	of	
civility	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 genuine	 –	 that	 is,	 unconditional	 –	 moral	 duty,	 she	
advances	the	claim	that	the	reason	people	are	willing	to	accept	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	







for	 unreasonable	 reasons	 with	 the	 naked	 exercise	 of	 power.328	 Such	 reasoning	 is	
















justification.	 In	 this	 context,	 he	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 reasons-to-decision	 frame	 and	 the	
coercion	 frame.	 According	 to	 the	 reason-for-decision	 frame,	 decisions	 are	 to	 be	 reasonably	











not	 needed.	 Lister	 also	 attacks	 the	 conviction	 that	 coercion	 is	 pro	 tanto	 bad.	 Such	 a	














Leland	 and	 van	 Wietmarschen	 put	 forward	 another	 variant	 of	 the	 argument	 for	
reciprocity	 in	 terms	 of	 civic	 friendship.	 They	 claim	 that	 adherence	 to	 the	 criterion	 of	












she	 does	 not	 recognize	 the	 principle	 of	 public	 reason,	 but	Alf	 can	have	 that	 relationship	with	
Charlie	if	he	does	so.	Even	if	there	are	more	Betty’s	than	Charlie’s,	Alf	should	support	laws	that	are	
publicly	justifiable,	for	the	sake	of	his	relationship	with	Charlie.”	Ibid.,	p.	124.	
334	 As	 Leland	 and	 van	Wietmarschen	 argue,	 “reasonable	 citizens	 are	 committed	 to	 deliberate	
about	 political	 issues	 together	 with	 their	 fellow	 citizens	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 particular	 set	 of	





set	 of	 liberal-democratic	 values,	 it	 defines	 a	 conception	 of	 the	 good	 shared	 by	 all	





citizens	have	pro	 tanto	 reason	 to	 comply	with	 the	principle,	 provided	 enough	of	 their	
fellow	citizens	likewise	comply.”337	
I	deem	the	interpretation	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	in	terms	of	civic	friendship	to	be	




liberalism,	 including	 the	central	 idea	of	public	 reason.	 In	other	words,	 civic	 friendship	
following	from	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	–	as	the	basis	of	political	legitimacy	in	political	
liberalism	–	does	not	 lead	 to	 the	ancient	understanding	of	 the	concept.	 It	 is	 conceived	
strictly	 in	 the	 Rawlsian	 terms	 implying	 that	 civic	 friendship	 allows	 a	 liberal	 political	
community	 to	 be	 stable	 for	 the	 right	 reasons.	 The	 interconnection	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 civic	
friendship	with	the	central	principles	of	political	liberalism	is	simultaneously	the	reason	












arising	 here	 is	 that	 such	 a	 conception	 of	 political	 community	 is	 too	 thin	 since	 deeper	 bonds	
between	citizens	are	missing.	On	 the	 contrary,	 the	bonds	between	citizens	 in	 the	nationalistic	




of	 coercion.339	 He	 denies	 that	 public	 justification	 is	 intertwined	 with	 a	 moralized	
conception	of	coercion	as	it	would	“presuppose	an	account	of	what	rights	people	have.	











constitutional	 (liberal)	 democracy	 that	 has	 a	 functional	 rule	 of	 law.	 Its	 rejection	 then	
entails	 acceptance	 of	 any	 of	 a	 family	 of	 contrasting	 principles	 whose	 spirit	 is	 nicely	























what	 I	 also	 see	 as	 problematic	 is	 Lister’s	 willingness	 to	 give	 up	 the	 epistemic	
reasonableness	 of	 persons	 (being	 a	 consequence	 of	 his	 argument	 that	 people	 who	
exercise	political	power	for	unreasonable	reasons	may	sincerely	believe	these	reasons	to	
be	 good	 reasons).345	 This	 is	 because,	 as	 I	 argued	 above,	 scratching	 the	 burdens	 of	
judgment	from	one’s	theory	implies	not	only	overlooking	pluralism	in	people’s	reasoning	
and	 cognition	 –	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 fact	 of	 pluralism	 as	 a	 central	 issue	 that	 public	 reason	
liberalism	deals	with	is	not	taken	seriously	–,	but	it	also	enables	forms	of	disrespect	at	the	
essentially	 political	 level.	 In	 my	 view,	 this	 an	 unavoidable	 consequence	 of	 Lister’s	
argument.	




be	 no	 argument	 from	 civic	 friendship	 without	 it.	 Hence,	 both	 interpretations	 of	 the	
















reciprocity	–	as	 interpreted	from	the	perspective	of	respect	 for	persons.	 I	have	argued	
that,	 according	 to	 some	 theorists,	 the	 principle	 of	 respect	 backing	 up	 the	 criterion	 of	
reciprocity	does	not	 in	 fact	 require	citizens	 to	abstract	away	 from	their	particularities	
when	publicly	deliberating.	These	 theorists	 claim	 that	 those	who	 think	 that	 refraining	
from	people’s	particularities	is	an	inevitable	consequence	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	
interpreted	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 respect	 understand	 the	 principle	
incorrectly.	 Respect,	 they	 contend,	 allows	 for	 people’s	 particularities.346	 In	 fact,	 the	
objection	to	respect	understood	as	an	impersonal	imperative	determining	the	criterion	of	
reciprocity	 is	 legitimate	 to	some	extent.	First,	by	enabling	 the	role	of	particularities	of	
people	to	be	overlooked,	the	imperative	of	respect	points	much	more	at	an	impersonal	
value,	 not	 at	 a	 particular	 person.	 Consequently,	 it	 says	 nothing	 about	 a	 person’s	
relationship	with	another	person	she	respects.	Hence,	the	demand	for	respect	that	would	
take	 into	 consideration	 an	 individual	 including	 her	 particularities	 –	 so-called	 second-
person	respect	understood	as	an	attitude	of	regard347	–	is	entitled.	Still,	as	I	pointed	out	
with	regard	to	Gaus	and	Vallier’s	theory,	I	do	not	believe	that	the	right	way	to	achieve	such	
a	 form	 of	 respect	 is	 to	 renounce	 the	 requirement	 for	 abstracting	 away	 from	 people’s	
particularities	when	publicly	deliberating	(that	 is	 the	assumption	of	shared	reasons).	 I	




of	 the	 argument	 from	 civic	 friendship	 –	 at	 all,	 the	 second-person	 form	 of	 recognition	
respect	must	be	ensured	across	the	political	community	as	a	whole.	
The	criterion	of	reciprocity	 interpreted	from	the	perspective	of	civic	 friendship,	as	has	
been	 indicated,	 is	 based	 on	 the	 same	 presumption	 as	 the	 interpretation	 from	 the	
perspective	 of	 the	 imperative	 of	 respect:	 people	 cannot	 use	 arguments	 reasonably	
unacceptable	to	their	fellow	citizens	during	public	deliberation.	At	the	same	time,	it	insists	
just	on	 the	consensus	view	(meaning	 that	 justificatory	reasons	are	 to	be	shared	by	all	
 






of	 the	 imperative	 of	 respect	 for	 persons.348	 Accordingly,	 one	may	 doubt	 that	 such	 an	
approach	solves	the	problem	of	disrespect	due	to	 ignorance	of	people’s	particularities.	




so	 to	 achieve	 a	 valuable	 relationship	 with	 their	 fellows,	 where	 the	 fact	 that	 the	




them	 to	 see	others	not	 as	 anonymous	political	 partners	but	 as	particular	 fellows	 they	
know,	whom	they	look	into	the	eyes,349	and	to	whom	they	make	claims.	In	what	follows,	I	
will	 contend	 that	 it	 is	 this	 complex	 relationship	 valued	 by	 its	 members	 that	
retrospectively	determines	the	form	of	respect.	
To	 explain	 this	 idea	 in	more	detail,	 I	will	 give	 an	 example.	 Specifically,	 I	will	 examine	
another	 valuable	 relationship	 –	marriage.	 There	 are,	 of	 course,	 conceptual	 differences	
between	a	political	community	and	marriage.	While	marriage	is	a	voluntary	relationship,	





emphasize	 is	what	 these	relationships	share:	 the	general	assumption	 that	members	of	
 
348	See	Ebels-Duggan,	“The	Beginning	of	Community,”	p.	50–71;	Lister,	Public	Reason	and	Political	
Community;	 Lister,	 “Public	 Reason	 and	 Reciprocity”;	 Leland	 and	 van	Weitmarschen,	 “Political	
Liberalism	and	Political	Community,”	p.	142–167. 







both	 a	 political	 community	 and	 a	 marriage	 have	 –	 or	 at	 least	 should	 have	 –	 equal	
standing.351	Following	these	remarks	–	and	also	what	I	said	earlier	–	suppose	that	two	
partners	are	in	an	equal	relationship	of	marriage.	Both	value	the	relationship	they	form	
together.	They	 thus	 acknowledge	 that	during	 their	 shared	decisions,	 they	will	 not	use	









time,	however,	 the	fact	that	 for	the	sake	of	 their	relationship	both	partners	do	not	use	
reasonably	unacceptable	arguments	when	making	shared	decisions	and	are	thus	willing	



































does	 not	 really	 make	 sense	 for	 citizens	 to	 disparage	 their	 fellows	 (with	 their	
particularities)	 and	 thereby	 provide	 them	with	 reasons	 not	 to	 accept	 the	 criterion	 of	
reciprocity.	In	other	words,	as	citizens	know	that	the	valuable	political	community	they	
seek	to	achieve	depends	on	support	 from	their	 fellows,	they	are	 interested	in	assuring	
these	fellows	that	that	they	will	have	equal	standing	within	a	shared	relationship.352	
To	sum	it	up,	I	see	two	general	–	yet	interconnected	–	consequences	following	from	such	
an	 interpretation	of	 the	 criterion	of	 reciprocity.	The	 first	 is	 that	 attempts	 to	achieve	a	
valuable	 relationship,	 which	 is	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 criterion	 of	 reciprocity,	 encourage	
people	 to	 look	 at	 each	 other	 comprehensively.	 Accordingly,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	
criterion	of	reciprocity	from	the	perspective	of	civic	friendship	provides	a	more	complex	
understanding	 of	 the	 political	 community	 than	 the	 interpretation	 based	 solely	 on	 the	










political	 community.	 Due	 to	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 the	 political	 community,	 however,	
motivation	 is	 determined	 not	 only	 by	 essentially	 political	 matters	 concerning	 the	
justification	 of	 political	 power	 but	 also	 by	 other	 factors	 influencing	 this	 shared	
relationship.	 Consequently,	 the	 motivation	 to	 accept	 the	 criterion	 of	 reciprocity	 is	
undermined	 –	 or	 even	 rendered	 impossible	 –	 in	 the	 case	 of	members	 of	 the	 political	
community	who	have	unequal	standing.	Hence,	for	citizens	to	have	reasons	to	abide	by	
the	criterion	of	reciprocity	and	value	the	political	community,	 the	argument	from	civic	
friendship	 endeavors	 to	 guarantee	 their	 equality	 within	 the	 political	 community	 as	 a	
whole:	 any	 inequality	 within	 the	 political	 community	 –	 no	 matter	 whether	 at	 the	
essentially	 political	 or	 societal	 level	 –	 may	 affect	 how	 its	 members	 evaluate	 this	
relationship.	 This	 way	 the	 idea	 of	 civic	 friendship	 ensures	 that	 a	 liberal	 political	
community	is	stable	for	the	right	reasons.		
This	brings	me	to	the	second	consequence	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	as	interpreted	
from	 the	 perspective	 of	 civic	 friendship.	 Because	 it	 provides	 a	 more	 comprehensive	
understanding	of	the	very	justification	of	political	power	–	as	it	takes	into	consideration	




the	 essentially	 political	 and	 societal	 levels	 influence	 the	 acceptance	 of	 the	 criterion	 of	
reciprocity,	there	is	an	implicit	presumption	that	people	will	be	respected	at	these	levels.	
In	other	words,	by	 its	very	character,	 the	criterion	of	 reciprocity	 interpreted	 from	 the	
perspective	of	civic	friendship	prevents	people	from	being	in	unequal	and	disrespected	
positions	within	 the	political	 community	after	 the	process	of	 justifying	 the	exercise	of	
political	power.	For	it	would	be	precisely	these	unequal	and	disrespected	people	who	–	
as	members	 of	 a	 political	 community	 –	would	have	 in	 fact	 no	 reason	 to	 advocate	 this	
valuable	relationship	as	the	very	purpose	of	the	justification.	Hence,	there	would	be	no	
valuable	relationship	at	all.	





particularities	 to	 be	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 civic	 friendship,	 the	 objection	 that	 respect	 in	 fact	
allows	for	people’s	particularities	is	not	valid	here.	It,	however,	does	not	mean	that	such	
an	 interpretation	 has	 no	 implications	 for	 the	 principle	 of	 respect.	 This	 is	 because	 the	
complexity	of	the	relationship	of	civic	friendship	within	the	political	community	–	and	the	
consequent	 perception	 of	 fellow	 citizens	 –	 implies	 that	 for	 there	 to	 be	 any	 valuable	
relationship	at	all,	people	must	be	respected.	Due	to	the	character	of	a	political	community	
based	on	 civic	 friendship,	 respect	pervades	 the	whole	 relationship	within	 the	political	
community	 and	 thus	 concerns	 both	 the	 essentially	 political	 and	 societal	 levels.	 At	 the	
same	time,	since	respect	 is	 inherently	directed	at	particular	people	(fellow	citizens),	 it	
consists	 in	 an	 individualizing	 act	 of	 recognition	 of	 others	 as	 having	 equal	 standing.353	





civic	 friendship	 leads	 back	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 respect	 within	 public	 reason,	 which,	
however	–	influenced	by	the	relationship	of	civic	friendship	–	has	a	wider	scope	than	the	
original	interpretation:	it	now	takes	into	consideration	even	the	societal	level	forming	the	
political	 community.	 Therefore,	 if	 I	 come	 back	 to	 the	 main	 criticism	 concerning	 the	
character	of	the	societal	level	of	a	liberal	political	community	–	that	it	is	a	manifestation	
of	the	culture	of	the	dominant	group	that	oppresses	others	–	it	is	in	fact	the	fundamental	
focus	of	 the	argument	 from	civic	 friendship	that	there	are	no	people	who	would	agree	
with	such	an	objection.	For	if	there	are	oppressed	–	and	thus	unequal	and	disrespected	–	
people	 within	 a	 political	 community,	 they	 will	 lack	 reasons	 to	 deem	 it	 as	 valuable.	
Accordingly,	the	argument	from	civic	friendship	crumbles	away.	
*	








insufficiently	 takes	 into	account	 the	role	of	 the	political	community.	To	deal	with	both	
these	 objections,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 that	 there	 is	 also	 another	 interpretation	 of	 the	





respect	 pervades	 the	 political	 community	 as	 a	whole	 –	 including	 both	 the	 essentially	
political	and	societal	levels	–	the	argument	from	civic	friendship	deals	with	the	problem	
of	unequal	and	disrespected	people	even	after	the	process	of	justifying	political	power.	In	
other	 words,	 as	 the	 criterion	 of	 reciprocity	 interpreted	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 civic	



















In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will	 apply	 my	 so	 far	 theoretical	 reasoning	 to	 a	 concrete	 example.	 I	
concluded	 the	 previous	 chapter	 by	 saying	 that	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 criterion	 of	
reciprocity	from	the	perspective	of	civic	friendship	plays	an	important	role	in	achieving	




to	 such	 a	 community	 and	 consider	 it	 to	 be	 valuable.	 If	 they	 lack	 a	 reason,	 they	 will	
simultaneously	have	no	motivation	to	support	it.	I	therefore	concluded	that	if	some	people	
are	 deemed	 merely	 as	 formal	 citizens	 of	 a	 particular	 political	 community	 but	 are	
otherwise	misrecognized	and	disrespected	–	and	do	not	 thus	see	themselves	to	be	 full	
members	of	it	–	they	(logically)	lack	reasons	to	support	and	value	it.	In	the	following	lines,	













and	 religiously	 disadvantaged,	 since	 the	 conception	 of	 laïcité	 (as	 the	 official	 state	
 93	
doctrine)	forced	these	people	to	cut	off	their	roots	(particularly	their	beliefs)	in	public	to	
become	 genuine	 citizens.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 laïcité	 has	 had	 more	 considerable	
consequences	for	these	people	than	for	the	social	majority.	 I	will,	 therefore,	argue	that	
what	 is	needed	 is	 to	 reverse	 the	conditions	of	misrecognition	and	disrespect	of	young	
Muslims	 of	 immigrant	 origin	 and	 provide	 them	 with	 reasons	 to	 value	 the	 political	
community	they	are	part	of.	Accordingly,	I	will	contend	that	the	solution	to	the	problems	








Algeria,	when	France	built	 colonies	with	 large	Muslim	populations.	 The	 first	waves	of	
French	colonial	subjects	migrating	 to	continental	France	occurred	during	World	War	 I	
and	World	War	II	as	a	response	to	French	military	losses	and	labor	shortages.355	However,	
migration	 at	 that	 time	was	 not	 that	 significant	 and	was	 thus	 not	 an	 issue	 for	 French	
society.	The	immigration	that	has	had	an	impact	on	the	character	of	France	began	after	
the	Algerian	War.	What	is	referred	to	as	the	first	generation	of	Muslim	immigrants	started	
coming	 to	France	 in	 the	1960s	and	1970s.	They	were	mostly	workers.	 Initially,	 it	was	
supposed	 that	 they	 would	 earn	 some	 money	 and	 then	 return	 to	 their	 countries	 of	
origin.356	Thus,	the	“myth	of	return”	was	created	as	it	was	assumed	that	these	workers	
would	 stay	 in	 France	 only	 temporarily.	 Accordingly,	 there	 was	 no	 official	 integration	
policy.	 As	 Barou	 claims,	 accommodation	 was	 the	 best	 description	 of	 “the	 policies	
implemented	towards	these	workers,	who	have	resided	in	France	for	long	periods	while	








1980s	and	1990s,	when	 the	myth	 turned	out	 to	be	 just	a	myth	and	when	the	workers	
brought	their	families	to	France.358	Despite	the	subsequent	effort	of	France	to	tighten	up	
the	 rules	 or	 even	 exclude	 immigrants,	 it	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 most	 multi-ethnic	
countries	in	Europe.359	
The	first	major	issue	associated	with	the	newcomers	that	has	influenced	the	character	of	











however,	has	been	specific	 to	France	has	been	 the	 fact	 that	apart	 from	socioeconomic	
hurdles,	Muslim	immigrants	have	also	 faced	official	hostility	to	public	displays	of	 their	










extra	money	 for	more	 teachers	 and	 better	 facilities.	 The	 FAS	 (Fobds	 d’Action	 Sociale	 pour	 le	
Travailleurs	 Immigrés	 et	 leurs	 Fammilles)	 program	 then	 targets	 poorly	 qualified	 immigrant-
origin	 residents	 for	 additional	 vocational	 training	 and	 also	 assists	 integration-oriented	 ethnic	
associations.	Fetzer,	Soper,	Muslims	and	the	State	in	Britain,	France,	and	Germany,	p.	68;	Withol	de	
Wenden,	“The	Case	of	France,”	p.	82;	Barou,	“Integration	of	Immigrants	 in	France:	A	Historical	








sphere.	 The	 concept	 of	 laïcité	 has,	 nonetheless,	 a	 long	 history	 in	 French	 politics	 and	
initially	had	nothing	to	do	with	Muslim	immigration.	It	was	originally	a	consequence	of	
the	long	struggle	between	clerical	and	anticlerical	forces	that	culminated	in	1905	with	the	
passing	 of	 the	 Separation	 Law,	 which	 stated	 that	 the	 French	 government	 would	 not	
recognize	–	or	financially	support	–	any	form	of	worship.365	Owing	to	this	complex	history,	
it	is	thus	too	simplistic	to	claim	that	laïcité	 instrumentally	harms	Muslims.	At	the	same	





the	 French	 Parliament	 enforced	 a	 ban	 on	 ostentatiously	wearing	 religious	 symbols	 in	
public	schools.368	In	the	name	of	laïcité,	it	was	argued	that	public	schools	should	not	be	
spaces	for	manifesting	religious	belief.	Consequently,	it	was	claimed	that	the	role	of	public	



































it	 is	 thus	 not	 that	 startling	 that,	 according	 to	 a	 survey374	 from	 2016,	 quite	 a	 large	
proportion	of	young	Muslims	hold	a	hard-line	view	of	their	faith	and	its	relationship	with	
 
this	 context,	 Simon	Reich	 believes	 that	 economic	 integration	 of	Muslims	 is	 crucial	 for	 further	
integration.	 He	 argues	 that	 “France	 has	 done	 a	woeful	 job	 of	 economically	 integrating	 young	
Muslims.	In	the	most	part,	they	remain	poor	and	marginalized,	both	economically	and	politically.	
[…]	 American	 history	 demonstrates	 that	 minority	 and	 immigrant	 groups	 first	 become	
economically	 integrated,	 then	 they	become	culturally	and	politically	 integrated.	 If	 they	remain	
poor,	then	they	generally	remain	unrepresented	and	often	resort	to	civil	disobedience	measures.	

















France.377	 The	majority	were	 committed	 by	 French	 citizens	 –	 those	 born	 or	 raised	 in	
France	–	who	had	been	radicalized	directly	in	France.	This	was	also	the	case	of	the	Kouachi	





after	 him,	 and	 Saïd	 and	 Chérif	 allegedly	 found	 her	 after	 she	 committed	 suicide.379	
Subsequently,	they	were	sent	to	a	foster	center	and	lived	also	in	an	orphanage	in	Corrèze,	






























the	 19th	 arrondissement,	 a	 working-class	 neighborhood	 populated	 mainly	 by	 Muslim	
immigrants	and	troubled	by	a	high	crime	rate	and	gang	turf	wars.	In	the	early	twenty-first	
century,	 the	brothers,	with	no	education	and	no	prospects,	were	hanging	around	Paris	


































led	 not	 only	 Kouachi	 but	 also	 other	 young	 imprisoned	 French	 radicals,	 who	 later	

















state.	The	most	massive	 so	 far	were	a	 series	of	attacks	 in	November	of	 the	 same	year	
during	which	more	than	130	people	were	killed	and	another	413	were	injured.	
5.2.	Disrespect	and	misrecognition	as	reasons	for	outrage	
The	 case	 of	 the	 Kouachi	 brothers	 is	 quite	 extreme:	 not	 only	 did	 they	 grow	 up	 under	













childhood,	 which	 further	 exacerbated	 their	 situation.	 One	 can	 thus	 say	 that	 they	 are	
exceptions,	since	they	were	destined	to	the	live	the	lives	they	did	from	the	very	beginning.	
At	the	same	time,	however,	it	is	indisputable	that	in	France	there	are	many	other	young	
people	of	 immigrant	origin	with	similar	 fates.	Although	they	may	not	be	orphans,	 they	








The	 first	 question	 that	 arises	 is,	 what	 would	 the	 relationship	 of	 young	 Muslims	 of	
immigrant	 origin	 to	 the	 French	 state	 be	 like	 if	 France	 successfully	 integrated	 them	
socioeconomically?	 Simon	 Reich,	 a	 professor	 of	 global	 affairs	 at	 Rutgers	 University,	







France	 launched	 programs	 to	 improve	 education	 and	 social	 services	 for	 young	 Muslims	 of	
immigrant	origin.	Apart	 from	this,	 there	have	also	been	special	programs	 in	higher	education.	
Specifically,	 in	 2001,	 the	 former	 director	 of	 Sciences	 Po,	 the	 prestigious	 French	 university	
producing	government	elites,	created	a	program	making	the	school	accessible	to	students	coming	
from	 disadvantaged	 backgrounds	 (the	 so-called	 ZEP	 –	 zones	 d’education	 prioritaite).	 Barou,	
“Integration	 of	 immigrants	 in	 France:	 A	 Historical	 Perspective,”	 pp.	 642–657;	 Racine,	 “Cour	
Administrative	d’Appel	de	Paris,	Formation	Plénière,	du	6	Novembre	2003,	02PA02821,	Inédit	au	
Racueil	Lebon.”	
395	 Still,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 across	 the	 age	 spectrum,	 most	 Muslims	 consider	
themselves	 to	 be	 French.	 The	bond	with	 the	 state	 is,	 however,	 severely	weakened	 among	 the	
young	generation	of	Muslims	growing	up	in	France	and	attending	French	schools.	El	Karoui,	“Un	





397	 See	Fleischmann,	Dronkers,	 “The	Socioeconomic	 Integration	of	 Immigrants	 in	 the	EU”;	Safi,	
“The	 Immigrant	 Integration	 Process	 in	 France”;	 Chebel	 d’Appollonia,	 Reich,	 Immigration,	
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hypothesis,	nonetheless,	is	that	the	better	socioeconomic	status	and	the	higher	education	
young	 immigrants	 achieve,	 the	 better	 life	 prospects	 they	will	 have.398	 Accordingly,	 as	
Reich	assumes,	 if	young	immigrants	were	socioeconomically	 integrated,	they	would	be	
less	liable	to	radicalization	and	subversive	attitudes	toward	the	state.	Therefore,	it	seems	
to	be	clear	 that	 the	socioeconomic	recognition	of	(and	thus	respect	 for)	young	Muslim	




The	 second	 problematic	 aspect	 of	 the	 French	 way	 of	 integrating	 young	 Muslim	
immigrants	 that	 I	 have	 mentioned	 concerns	 their	 cultural-religious	 misrecognition.	
Specifically,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 principle	 of	 laïcité,	 the	 aim	of	which	 is	 to	 create	 a	
unified	citizenship	regardless	of	people’s	particularities,	disadvantages	primarily	young	
French	 Muslims	 of	 immigrant	 origin.400	 Correspondingly,	 these	 people	 are	 not	 only	
socioeconomically	 disadvantaged	 but	 also	 culturally	 and	 religiously	 misrecognized	 as	
laïcité	 forces	them	to	cut	off	 their	 identities	–	which	can	have	very	 important,	but	also	
unstable	meaning	for	such	young	people	–	in	public	and	adhere	only	to	universal	French	
values.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 crucial	 question401	 is	 how	 –	 whether	 or	 to	 what	 extent	 –	
successful	 socioeconomic	 integration	would	 solve	 (or	 at	 least	 temper)	 the	 problem	of	
cultural-religious	misrecognition	and	disrespect,	since	they	are	basically	communicating	
vessels.402	 However,	 regardless	 of	 the	 exact	 impact	 of	 socioeconomic	 integration	 on	
 
Integration,	and	Security;	Algan,	Dustmann,	Glitz,	Manning,	“The	Economic	Situation	of	First	and	
Second-Generation	 Immigrants	 in	 France,	 Germany,	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom”;	 Ager,	 Strang,	



















young	 Muslims	 of	 immigrant	 origin	 –	 and	 assured	 young	 Muslims	 the	 same	 level	 of	






It	 follows	 that	 if	 misrecognized	 (and	 thus	 disrespected)	 people	 –	 young	 Muslims	 of	
immigrant	origin	in	this	case	–	living	on	the	margins	of	society	were	no	longer	in	such	a	
subordinated	 and	 unequal	 position	 then	 they	 would	 not	 only	 lack	 reasons	 for	
radicalization	and	subversive	activities	against	their	own	state,	but	they	could	also	finally	












achievement.	 These	 principles	 “represent	 normative	 perspectives	 with	 reference	 to	 which	
subjects	can	reasonably	argue	that	existing	forms	of	recognition	are	inadequate	or	insufficient	and	
need	to	be	expanded.”	As	such,	they	are	also	used	in	distributive	struggles.	Personally,	I	do	not	
want	 to	 enter	 this	 debate	 as	 I	 mention	 socioeconomic	 disadvantages	 only	 with	 regard	 to	 a	
particular	example:	I	point	to	the	fact	that	in	the	case	of	French	Muslims	of	immigrant	origin,	it	is	
a	combination	of	socioeconomic	and	cultural-religious	misrecognition.	Hence,	even	 though	my	














toward	 the	 groups	 that	 represent	 them.408	 The	 recognition	 I	 am	 talking	 about	 is	 the	
recognition	of	particular	individuals	within	the	shared	political	process,	where	all	citizens	
recognize	that	 the	political	community	 is	comprised	of	a	number	of	people	who	differ.	

















report	 on	 the	 disturbances	 (basically	 riots)	 in	 Oldham,	 Burnley	 and	 Bradford,	 and	 the	 report	
emphasized	the	way	 in	which	social	segregation	had	had	adverse	 implications	 for	conflict	and	
disorder.”	 Heath,	 Demireva,	 “Has	Multiculturalism	 Failed	 in	 Britain?,”	 p.	 162.	 See	 also	 Cantle,	
Community	Cohesion.	
408	It	has	become	a	problem	primarily	in	Britain	(but	also	in	the	Netherlands).	As	Sniderman	and	











proposed	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 text	 using	 a	 concrete	 example.	 Based	 mainly	 on	 rational	
reasons	–	and	referring	to	empirical	evidence	–	I	have	pointed	to	the	case	of	France	and	
the	problems	it	faces	with	integrating	young	French-born	Muslims	of	immigrant	descent.	
I	 have	 argued	 that	 since	 these	 young	 people	 in	 particular	 are	 exposed	 to	 both	
socioeconomic	and	cultural-religious	disadvantages	that	cause	their	misrecognition	and	
disrespect,	they	lack	reasons	to	value	the	political	community	within	which	they	suffer	
from	 poor	 treatment.	 Accordingly,	 not	 only	 do	 they	 often	 give	 precedence	 to	 their	
religious	convictions,	but	they	are	also	willing	to	use	violence	against	their	country.	We	
have	seen	this	in	the	context	of	a	series	of	terrorist	attacks	in	France	in	the	past	few	years.	
I	 thus	suggest	 that	 to	avoid	such	subversive	activities	against	 the	state	of	which	 these	
people	 are	 citizens,	 they	 must	 be	 freed	 of	 both	 socioeconomic	 and	 cultural-religious	
misrecognition	and	disrespect.	Only	 then	can	 they	start	 to	build	a	mutual	 relationship	























is	 not	 sufficient	 for	 an	 adequate	 coming-to-terms	with	 pluralism.	 In	 other	words,	 the	
principle	of	respect	requires	that	political	liberalism	considers	the	character	of	a	political	
community	 in	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 –	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 multi-layered	 –	 way:	 political	
liberalism	cannot	address	only	the	issue	of	the	legitimacy	of	political	power,	since	many	
citizens	 may	 remain	 disrespected	 even	 after	 the	 process	 of	 justifying	 the	 exercise	 of	
political	 power.	 Furthermore,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 universal	 character	 of	 respect,	 it	 is	
incoherent	to	refer	to	it	only	in	connection	with	a	particular	sphere	but	otherwise	ignore	
it	(or	even	tolerate	disrespect).	I	have	thus	argued	that	to	be	in	conformity	with	its	default	















own	claims.	Accordingly,	referring	to	 the	 ideas	advanced	by	political	 liberalism,	 I	have	
argued	 that	 it	 can	comprehensively	reflect	on	 the	manifestations	of	pluralism	across	a	
political	 community	 as	 a	whole.	 It	means	 that	 it	 is	 able	 to	 ensure	 respect	 at	 both	 the	
essentially	political	and	societal	levels	that	constitute	such	a	community.	Hereby,	I	have	
concluded	that	political	liberalism	can	take	on	a	more	coherent	form	while	still	adverting	
exclusively	 to	 its	 theoretical	 sources.	 Specifically,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 a	 dual	
interpretation	of	the	criterion	of	reciprocity	that	creates	the	prerequisites	for	achieving	
respect	 at	 both	 levels	 of	 a	 political	 community:	 I	 have	 ascribed	 a	 special	 role	 to	 the	









this	 proactive	 impulse	within	 the	 very	 liberal	 political	 theory	 that	 I	 consider	 to	 be	 an	






















it	 into	 account	 only	 restrictively.	 In	 this	 context,	 Leland	 and	 van	 Wietmarschen,	 for	
instance,	claim	that	civic	friendship	should	be	based	on	mutual	concern	for	one	another’s	
interests.412	Yet,	although	I	generally	agree	with	their	line	of	reasoning,	at	the	same	time,	
I	 consider	 the	 topic	 of	 mutual	 concern	 to	 be	 a	 much	more	 comprehensive	 issue,	 the	
explanation	of	which	inevitably	covers	a	wide	range	of	other	topics,	for	example,	the	role	
of	emotions	in	clarifying	the	incentives	for	such	concern.	I	am	sympathetic	to	this	possible	
course	 of	 liberal	 political	 theory	 (in	 fact,	 I	 believe	 that	 invoking	 emotions	might	 even	
strengthen	 my	 own	 argument	 for	 respect).	 Still,	 I	 think	 that	 this	 is	 an	 open	 field	 of	

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































liberal	 political	 community.	 It	 challenges	 political	 liberalism’s	 focus	 solely	 on	 the	
essentially	political	 level	–	 that	 is	on	the	 justification	of	 the	exercise	of	political	power	
under	 the	 conditions	 of	 pluralism	 –,	 as	 it	 overlooks	 other	manifestations	 of	 pluralism	
equally	important	for	a	liberal	political	community.	That	concerns	the	so-called	societal	
level	as	another	formative	level	of	a	liberal	political	community	characterized	mainly	by	
the	 differences	 among	 people	 due	 to	 their	membership	 in	 diverse	 groups.	 One	 of	 the	
consequences	 of	 such	 a	 limited	 focus	 is	 that	 although	 political	 power	 is	 justified	 to	
citizens,	 still	 many	 them	 may	 feel	 being	 treated	 unfairly	 within	 a	 liberal	 political	
community.	 Since	 the	 author	 argues	 that	 the	 objective	 of	 the	 justification	 of	 political	












the	understanding	of	 the	 character	of	 respect	 from	 the	 third-person	 imperative	 to	 the	
second-person	act	of	recognition.	This	way,	the	argument	from	civic	friendship	allows	to	









Disertační	 práce	 se	 věnuje	 tématu	 pluralismu	 a	 diverzity	 v	 liberální	 politické	 teorii	 a	
v	rámci	 liberální	 politické	 komunity.	 Práce	 problematizuje	 zaměření	 politického	
liberalismu	pouze	na	esenciálně	politickou	úroveň	–	tedy	na	otázku	ospravedlnění	výkonu	
politické	 moci	 v	podmínkách	 pluralismu	 –,	 jelikož	 jsou	 přehlíženy	 další,	 pro	 liberální	
politickou	komunitu	stejně	důležité,	projevy	pluralismu.	To	se	týká	především	takzvané	









reciprocity	 –	 jakožto	 základu	politickému	 legitimity	 a	 principu	podepírajícímu	projekt	
politického	liberalismu	–,	přičemž	volá	po	jeho	dvojí	interpretaci:	kritérium	reciprocity	

































liberalismo	 politico	 tenendo	 conto	 degli	 aspetti	 sociali	 del	 fatto	 del	 pluralismo	 che	
impattano	la	formazione	della	sfera	pubblica	delle	comunità	politiche	liberali.	Utilizzando	
argomenti	 tratti	 dalla	 letteratura	 concernente	 la	 ragione	 pubblica	 liberale,	 la	 tesi	
argomenta	in	favore	di	una	lettura	specifica	del	principio	dell’eguale	rispetto	che	tenga	
conto	 sia	 degli	 aspetti	 politici	 che	 di	 quelli	 sociali	 delle	 comunità	 politiche	 liberali.	 In	
questa	analisi,	l’autrice	investiga	il	criterio	della	reciprocità	–	inteso	come	il	criterio	alla	
base	della	legittimità	politica	e	del	principio	fondativo	dell’intero	progetto	del	liberalismo	
politico	 –	 e	 propone	 una	 duplice	 interpretazione	 di	 tale	 concetto:	 il	 criterio	 della	
reciprocità	è	espressione	politica	non	solo	del	concetto	normativo	dell’equale	rispetto,	ma	




viene	 più	 facilmente	 inteso	 nei	 termini	 di	 un	 imperativo	 che	 impone	 un	 atto	 di	
 123	
riconoscimento	 in	 seconda-persona,	 piuttosto	 che	 un	 più	 indiretto	 atto	 di	 rispetto	 in	
terza-persona.	Di	conseguenza,	investigare	il	tema	dell’amicizia	tra	cittadini	ci	consente	
di	 sostenere	un’interpretazione	più	 ricca	di	 eguale	 rispetto,	 in	 grado	di	 rendere	 conto	
degli	aspetti	sia	politici	che	sociali	del	vivere	collettivo	in	una	comunità	politica	di	stampo	
liberale.		
Keywords:	pluralismo,	liberalismo	politico,	rispetto,	riconoscimento,	reciprocità,		
		 										amicizia	tra	cittadini		
	
